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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
V.

Case No. 20160485-SC

DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS,
Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This appeal is before this Court on a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal under Utah Code
Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND
GROUNDS FOR APPEAL

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted by Order of this Court on
September 12, 2016 as to the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a witness whose
preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial was unavailable and
that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him was violated by the presentation of the
preliminary hearing1estimony at his trial.
2. Whether the ·Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioners petition for
rehearing raising new arguments that trial and appellate counsel provided
ineffective assistance.
I

A copy of the court of appeals decision in State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57,
is included in Addendum A. Appellant addresses the issues as follows:

I. Right of Confrontation Violation.
A.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's

ruling admitting preliminary hearing testimony of a victim/witness.
B.

~

Standard of Review: On certiorari this Court reviews a decision of the

Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court, for correctness, turning in part on
whether the Court of Appeals accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the
appropriate standard of review. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ,I 15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101
(Sup.Ct.). "When reviewing rulings on hearsay, we review '[l]egal questions regarding

@

admissibility ... for correctness, ... questions of fact ... for clear error,' and the final
'ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion."' State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ,I
10, 314 P.3d 1014 quoting State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,I 9, 243 P.3d 902.
Interpretations of federal and state constitutions are questions of law.

Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ,I 7, 218 P.3d 590, 593 (Sup.Ct.).

State v.

Where it is not contended

that the analysis under the Utah Constitution is any different from the analysis under the
federal constitution, a defendant's contentions are reviewed under the federal
constitution. State v. Drawn, 791 P .2d 890, 893 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Specific
analysis must be provided for this Court to engage in state constitutional analysis. State

v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) A trial court's admission of testimonial
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
2

Id., 791 P.2d at 894.

To hold a

®

constitutional error harmless, it must be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
@

State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327,359 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1993)
C.

Grounds for Review: The day before trial, defense counsel objected to the

admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of an absent witness, who had not been
subpoenaed, as purportedly "unavailable" pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 804. R.166:6-7. The
trial court overruled the objection. R.166 at 12-13, 34. The next day, at trial, defense
counsel renewed the objection to admission of the preliminary hearing testimony,
arguing, inter alia, that the State's efforts were insufficient and that further attempts to
locate the witness should have been made. R.167 :2-17. The district court again overruled
~

the objection, and the witness' testimony was played for the jury. R.167:149.
II. The Court of Appeals Denial Or Refusal To Rule On Goins' Petition For

Rehearing Regarding Erroneous Self-Defense Jury Instruction.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in denying or refusing to decide the

issue regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to raise the issue of
trial counsel's ineffective assistance in submitting an erroneous self-defense jury
instruction which previous appellate counsel had failed to bring to the court's attention?
Standard of Review: On certiorari this Court reviews a decision of the

Court of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court, for correctness, which turns, in part,
on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard
of review. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50,

,r

15, 144 P.3d 1096, 1101 (Sup.Ct.). Where

defense counsel affirmatively approved the jury instruction at trial, it is reviewed under
3

the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103,

,r 7,

132 P.3d 703, 707. Ineffective assistance of counsel questions require a showing that
counsel's performance was deficient, "that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984).
Grounds for Review: The Court of Appeals issued its decision, State v. Goins,

2016 UT App 57 on March 24, 2016. Newly appointed undersigned counsel petitioned
the Court of Appeals for a rehearing on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal, on April 19, 2016. On April 25, 2016 the Utah Court of Appeals requested
further briefing on the issue of whether ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal could
be raised in a petition for rehearing.

On May 4, 2016, Petitioner submitted further

briefing on that issue. On May 17, 2016, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Order
denying the petition for rehearing without comment.
During discussion of proposed jury instructions, the subject arose of Defendant's
requested instruction discussing the burden and weight, inter alia, relative to self-defense.
R.60. The trial court gave the instruction as written, "over the State's objection." R.167:
229-231. Respecting the underlying issue of the faulty jury instruction, unpreserved
claims before the trial court are reviewed for plain error and/or ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ,r 28,276 P.3d 1207, 1218.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The statutes and rules relevant to the issues are included in Addendum C.
4

Ci

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS,
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.

Desean Michael Goins was convicted of Aggravated Assault, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2006), and Threatening with or Using
a Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, a Class A Misdemeanor in violation of Utah
Code Ann.§ 76-10-506 (2010). R.75-76;R.168:51-52. The Defendant was acquitted of
®

one charge of Mayhem, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-105. Id.
For the offense of Aggravated Assault, Mr. Goins was sentenced to a suspended
prison term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison; for the offense of Threatening
with or Using Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, Mr. Goins was sentenced to 180
days in the Salt Lake County jail, with credit for 158 days served, and was placed on
probation for 36 months with AP&P.

R.139-141.

Judgement, Sentence and

Commitment, Addendum D. An Order to Show Cause and Warrant of Arrest, R.161164, were issued based upon affidavits of Mr. Goins' probation officer, R.159-160, 194(i)

196. The record on appeal does not reflect the disposition, however, the trial court
revoked his probation and he is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison.
Amended Minute Entry, Order to Show Cause, July 14, 2014, Addendum E.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The three counts of the Amended Information involved two victims: Counts I and
5

II, Jacob Omar, and Count III, Gabriel Estrada. R.16-18 (See Amended Information,
Addendum B, probable cause statement); R.166:2.
The preliminary hearing testimony of Gabriel Estrada. R.202:2-13, which was
played for the jury at trial, R.167:149, reflects the following. On July 5, 2013, Desean
Goins and his girlfriend, Star, went to Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City in an effort to locate
an individual named Gabriel Estrada; Desean believed Gabriel Estrada had stolen his cell
phone the night before. R.202 :5. Goins confronted Estrada outside of the homeless
shelter near Pioneer Park about the missing cell phone, pulled out a knife, and waived it
in front of Estrada, threatening him if he didn't return his phone. R.202:4-7. Estrada
denied stealing Goins' cell phone, indicating to Goins that his friend had awakened
before Estrada had and left (inferentially with Goins' cell phone). R. 202:7. Estrada then
indicated he had nothing to do with it and walked away. Id.
Desean Goins and Star then approached Jacob Omar, who was asleep on a blanket
in the park. R. 167 at 123-124. According to the testimony of Omar, Goins and Star
accused his "street son," Gabriel Estrada, of stealing Desean's cell phone. R.167-124125. During the State's direct examination, the testimony Jacob Omar first brought forth
the issue of Mr. Goins acting in self-defense. Mr. Omar indicated on direct examination
by the prosecution that he was being questioned by Mr. Goins and his friend, Star, and
that Mr. Omar was the initial aggressor:
Next thing I knew just because being waken up in the middle of the
afternoon to this nonsense, I see Desean stepping onto my blanket. I don't
allow anybody to step onto my blanket. So I got up and I pushed him off
6

@

@

my blankets.
R.167:124-125.

The Defendant was then placed in a defensive position and

reacted accordingly. R.167: 125-6. A physical altercation ensued, and when Jacob Omar
was on top of Mr. Goins during the fight and holding him down on the ground, Omar
claimed that Goins took a bite of Jacob's earlobe. R.167 at 127. The fight continued, and
Omar testified that Goins had bitten off his earlobe and stabbed him under his left arm.
R.167 at 128-131. Police responding to the scene apprehended and arrested Desean
Goins.
The State charged Desean Goins by Amended Information with one count of
(ii)

Mayhem, a second degree felony, and two counts of Aggravated Assault, third degree
felonies, and a jury trial was scheduled for October 23-24, 2013. R. 16-18.
During discussion of proposed jury instructions, the subject arose of defendant's
requested instruction discussing the burden and weight, inter alia, relative to self-defense.
R.60. The trial court gave the instruction as written, "over the State's objection." R.167:
229-231. See instruction, No. 24.
Following the completion of the trial, the jury acquitted the Defendant of the
charge of Mayhem, but returned a guilty verdict for one count of Aggravated Assault for
the stabbing of Jacob Omar, and for a lesser included a charge of Threatening with or
Using Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, a Class A misdemeanor, for the encounter
with Gabriel Estrada.

7
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. The State failed to carry its heightened burden under the Confrontation Clause of
establishing that Gabriel Estrada was an "unavailable" witness, which would allow the
State to utilize his preliminary hearing testimony at trial. The trial court's ruling that the
witness was unavailable was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the witness
was a victim and the only percipient witness to the event about which he testified. Even
if the witness was technically unavailable, his testimony from preliminary hearing should
not have been allowed at trial as counsel did not have the opportunity to conduct full and
fair cross-examination at trial, for several reasons, one of which is that only plausibility
and not credibility are in issue at preliminary hearing, the sole purpose of a preliminary
hearing being for the establishment of probable cause pursuant to Utah State
Constitution, Utah Const. Art. I, § 12.
2. Undersigned counsel was appointed after the decision in State v. Goins was issued. It
was apparent that prior appointed counsel had failed to raise an important issue.
Undersigned counsel petitioned the Court of Appeals for a rehearing on the basis that
prior counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel in submitting an erroneous self-defense instruction which the trial court used
to instruct the jury. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing without
comment. The Court of Appeals should have decided the merits of Mr. Goins' Petition
for Rehearing on the basis of the ineffective assistance of prior counsel on appeal. This
Court should reverse and remand on the basis of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel
8

and the prejudice effected by the erroneous jury instruction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING AN UNSUBPOENAED
WITNESS UNAVAILABLE UNDER RULE 804 AND ADMITTING HIS
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY AT TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES.

On October 23, 2013, the district court informed the parties that a jury panel had
not been called for the first day of trial in this case, and therefore the trial was postponed
until the following day. R.166:2-3. Gabriel Estrada did not appear for trial that morning
and the State made an offer of proof as to his unavailability under Utah R. Evid., Rule
804, and request to use his testimony from preliminary hearing at trial, to which Mr.
Goins objected. R.166:3-12. A copy of this portion of the trial transcript is included in
Addendum F.

The State proffered that a subpoena was emailed to Gabriel Estrada's

pastor, Russ, who purportedly gave Mr. Estrada notice of the court date. R.166:4-5.
Defense counsel accepted the proffer, R.166: 12, but objected, arguing, inter alia, that Mr.
Estrada was not shown to be "unavailable" pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 804, that
his testimony was inadmissible under the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation, and that the preliminary hearing testimony should not be admissible at
trial. R.166:6-7,9-11.
The trial court overruled the objection, finding that Gabriel Estrada was

9

unavailable under Rule 804 and allowed his preliminary hearing testimony to be
admissible at trial the following day. R.166:12-13, 34.
On October 24, 2013, day two of the trial, still not disputing the State's proffer,
R.167:14, defense counsel renewed the objection to the admission of Gabriel Estrada's
preliminary hearing testimony, arguing, inter alia, that the State's efforts to locate Mr.
Estrada were insufficient and that further attempts to locate him should have been made

in the light of the fact that the trial was postponed. R.167 :2-19. A copy of this portion of
the transcript is contained in Addendum G. The defense further argued that the defense
had a different motive in cross-examining Estrada at trial and that certain matters
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript should not be allowed in evidence, e.g.,

@

Estrada's statement that he moved out from living with Mr. Goins when his "bike ended
up missing," R.202:16, inferring that Mr. Goins had stolen it. Id. The trial court again
overruled the objection, and Gabriel Estrada's testimony was played for the jury during
trial. R.167:16-19,149. A copy of Mr. Estrada's testimony is contained in Addendum H.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
STATE MADE A GOOD FAITH EFFORT TO PROCURE THE
ATTENDANCE OF THE WITNESS. THE WITNESS WAS NOT
SHOWN TO BE "UNAVAILABLE."
The Court of Appeals determined the State had made a sufficient effort to produce

@

@

the victim/witness, Gabriel Estrada, by keeping in touch with people believed to know
him. Goins at ,r,r 4 - 5. At no time does the record indicate that, during the time period
in which this person could have been subpoenaed, that the State sought by conventional

10

@

means to actually serve a subpoena upon him. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed the
@

testimony from preliminary hearing to be read to the jury over Mr. Goins' objection.
Goins at 16.

The Court of Appeals agreed that the statement was hearsay under Utah R. Evid.,
Rule 801, subject to an exception, i.e, "the admission of prior testimony by an
unavailable potential witness." Goins at 1 8. The Court of Appeals agreed that a good
faith effort must be made to produce the witness before a finding of unavailability can be
made. Id. at

1 9.

"A party can only introduce a witness' testimonial statements into

evidence if the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the opposing party had a prior
(i)

opportunity to cross-ex~mine." State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 19, 218 P.3d 590. The
Court of Appeals cited authority, however, to the effect that Rule 804(a)(5) does not
require a patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential witness . . . whose
physical location and address are completely unknown. Goins at 1 10. It cited State v.
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), in support of its position that the prosecution

had made every reasonable effort to procure the attendance of the witness.
One major distinction, however, between the circumstances in Drawn and the
instant case, is that, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, in Drawn, the pro~ecution
actually subpoenaed the witness three times. Goins at 1 11. In the instant case, while
some effort was made to keep in touch with Pastor Russ, who was familiar with the
witness, by e-mailing him a copy of the subpoena, R.166:4, there is no indication in the
@

record that any effort was made to actually serve a subpoena upon Mr. Estrada, in

11

accordance with the requirements of the law, at any time. If the pastor was able to locate

Mr. Estrada and inform him of the trial date, surely the State could have subpoenaed him

@

properly and directly. The State proffered that it maintained contact with Russ and, when
he left for another job, with his replacement, Jacob. Upon hearing from Jacob that Mr.
Estrada, "in the last few weeks," had gotten into trouble and was in jail, R.166:4-5, it
would have been a perfect opportunity for the State to properly effect service of the
subpoena on Estrada, but the State did not do that, nor did it even check the jail roster
until the week and the day before trial, whereupon it found Estrada to have been released.
R.166:5. The subpoena was merely e-mailed and presumably passed along, although we
don't have a concrete record that Estrada received trial notice.
The State was able to produce Mr. Estrada at the preliminary hearing to testify.
According to the record, the State sent a subpoena for Mr. Estrada for the trial, to Pastor
Russ via email and asked him to give it Mr. Estrada. R.166:3-5. The State relied solely
upon that method. R.166:2-6. That constitutes a feeble effort by any standard.
The State apparently was no longer in touch with Pastor Russ at the time of trial.
R.166:4. No testimony from him was presented at time of trial. The Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure has specific requirements in the service of subpoenas upon witnesses.
Utah R. Crim. P. 14. Proper service of a subpoena can be effected as follows: "(3) A

@

subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years who is not a party.
Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter
personally and notifying the witness or interpreter of the contents. A peace officer shall

12

@

serve any subpoena delivered for service in the peace officer's county." Id. It is a matter
~

of conjecture whether the subpoena was actually served, let alone whether it was served
in accordance with Rule 14.
One of the safeguards of having a responsible person, such as a constable or
sheriff, serve a subpoena, is that a proper return gives opposing counsel reasonable notice
of the actual service. It is not for nothing that the Rule requires that, "(4) Written return
of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court and to the person requesting
that the subpoena be served, stating the time and place of service and by whom service
was made." Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 14. That did not occur in this case. This failure
severely undermines the question of the witness' unavailability.
Federal courts give certain deference to State court proceedings.

The United

States Supreme Court noted that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254, imposes a highly deferential standard in evaluating
state-court rulings, demanding that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt." Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 66, 132 S. Ct. 490, 491 (2011). For State court
purposes, the United States Supreme Court applied the standard that, "a witness is not
'unavailable' for purposes of the ... confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Id., 565 U.S. at
69 quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 724-725, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255
(1968). "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness ... is a
(§)

question of reasonableness." Hardy, 565 U.S. at 70 quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.

13

56, 74, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (1980) [reversed on other grounds, Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004)].

The Tenth Circuit

@

recognizes that "(d)espite the loss of . . . important aspects of confrontation, where the.
government is able to prove the unavailability of a witness, the Sixth Amendment
includes a "rule of necessity" permitting use of prior testimony." Cook v. McKune, 323
F.3d 825, 832 (10th Cir. 2003). "But because there is a real cost to the defendant in
foregoing true confrontation, the unavailability requirement must be more than a
formality." Id at 833.

Nevertheless, "if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that

affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may
demand their effectuation." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. "The ultimate question is

@

whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to
locate and present that witness. As with other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution
bears the burden of establishing this predicate." Id., 448 U.S. 74-75.
Federal courts view the Confrontation Clause to require a stronger showing of
unavailability and reliability than does evidentiary Rule 804. Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69,
72 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).

That is the law in Utah as well.

"In a criminal case, the

Confrontation Clause establishes a heavy burden on the prosecutor to exercise good faith
efforts to produce the out-of-court witness." Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence,

@

Unavailability: Unable to Procure Attendance [Rule 804(a)(5), p. 869 (2015-2016), citing

Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). "The right to
confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine

14

@

and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing
@

is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial,
simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable
cause exists to hold the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for
holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing
satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the witness is shown [*726] to be
actually unavailable, this is not, as we have pointed out, such a case." Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. at 725-26.
Utah courts apply a standard perhaps more stringent than its federal counterparts.

i)

"'(F)or a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it must be practically impossible to
produce the witness in court.... Every reasonable effort must be made to produce the
witness.' This requires the proponent of the out-of-court statement to do his utmost to
'procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.' Utah R. Evid.
804(a)(5)." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,

,r

15, 84 P.3d 1183, 1187 (Sup.Ct.) quoting

State v. Webb, 779 P .2d 1108, 1113 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted); accord State v.
Drawn, 791 P .2d 890, 893 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that where the state had
subpoenaed each witness three times prior to trial, these efforts were sufficient to
demonstrate unavailability for purposes of the hearsay exception), cited by Mangrum &
Benson on Utah Evidence, Unavailability of Declarant, [Rule 804(a)], supra, p. 867; State

v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142-43 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(" The State bears the burden of
proving unavailability by competent evidence."). "Thus, in general, a witness will not be
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found unavailable until the proponent of the evidence demonstrates that he has used all
reasonable means at his disposal to secure the attendance of the witness." Montoya, at ,r

@

16.
A further question goes to the issue of when the State gave notice of the witness'
likely absence. The timing of the State's notice in the instant case is suspect. Notifying
the trial court on the first day of trial that a witness is "unavailable" is too late to allow
for reasonable investigation.

A recent decision from Massachusetts highlights the

problem:
Where a witness is unavailable due to illness or infirmity, the "good faith
effort" required of the Commonwealth is to promptly inform the court and
the defendant of the unavailability of the witness once the Commonwealth
learns of it, so that they have an adequate opportunity to learn more about
the witness's medical condition and to explore the alternative of a
continuance or a deposition. Where the unavailability of the witness is not
made known until the first day of trial, the defendant has little opportunlty
to investigate the witness's medical condition to challenge the prosecutor's
claim of unavailability. At that juncture, ordering a continuance or
scheduling a deposition might be impracticable, effectively denying the
defendant the possibility of these alternatives.
Commonwealth v.

Housewright,

(2015)( emphasis added).

470 Mass. 665, 674, 25 N.E.3d 273, 283

The impracticality in the instant matter of ordering a

continuance is obvious, whereas if the State had notified court and counsel that the
witness was in jail when that was learned, or had recently been released, defense counsel
may have been able to locate and make their own provisions to secure the witness'
attendance.
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The Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the trial court exercised
Ci>

appropriate discretion in finding that the witness was unavailable under the
circumstances, even under those circumstances set forth in the Court's opinion. Goins at

11

12 - 13. Even with knowledge that a witness is available during substantial periods

prior to trial (although perhaps not immediately), no attempt was made to issue, properly
serve a subpoena, the contents of which are not in the record, and secure and file a proper
return, nor was there any attempt indicated in the record to notify the trial court or
counsel in a timely manner of the witness' apparent unavailability. Accordingly, the
witness should not be found unavailable.

Mr. Goins was prejudiced by the trial court's finding and the Court of Appeals
decision affirming it was error. Respecting an error involving the Sixth Amendment, this
Court must be able to "confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106
S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (1986). To hold a state constitutional error harmless under Utah Const.
Art. I, § 12, the Utah State constitutional analog to the Sixth Amendment, it must, again,
~

be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327,359 (Utah
Sup.Ct. 1993) ("In other words, the side which benefited by the error (the prosecution)
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict (or
sentence) obtained.").

Where "the error in question amounts to a violation of a

defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
@

States Constitution, its harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal is
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required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Villarreal, 889
P.2d 419, 425 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1995) quoting State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah
1987) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284, 89 S. Ct.
1726 (1969)); see also State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,

,r

86 n.88, 299 P.3d 892, 922

(Sup.Ct.).
Obviously, without Mr. Estrada's testimony, there could be no conviction on
Count III, the Threatening charge, as he was not only the alleged victim under that
charge, but the only percipient witness. Erroneously finding Mr. Estrada to have been
unavailable as a witness was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of
Appeals erred holding the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding Estrada

@

"unavailable."
The prejudice does not end there, however. Mr. Estrada's testimony was also vital
to the State's case, not only because he was the victim under Count III, but also because
he corroborated Mr. Omar's testimony regarding the knife, Mr. Goins' behavior, and his
motives when he was looking for Mr. Omar.

"Confrontation Clause concerns are

heightened and courts insist on more diligent efforts by the prosecution where a "key" or
"crucial" witness' testimony is involved." McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 265-6
(3rd Cir. 1999).

For such an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different

outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict. State v.
Young, supra, 853 P.2d at 345. Presentation of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony

at trial necessarily undermines confidence in the overall verdict.
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C. PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT BE
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. ALLOWING MR. ESTRADA'S
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY WAS PREJUDICIAL TO
MR. GOINS.
The Court of Appeals held with pnor precedent that the introduction of
preliminary hearing testimony satisfies the confrontation clause and Utah R. Evid.
804(b)(l)(B), because Mr. Goins was given the "opportunity" to confront the witness.

Goins at, 17 citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,, 18, 314 P.3d 1014 [Defendant
was given ample opportunity to cross-examine the missing witness but declined to avail
himself of the opportunity. "While ' [d]efense counsel may have elected to forego crossexamination[,] ... that does not mean that the opportunity was not available'." quoting

State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986)].
The current authorities overlook the fact that the current nature of preliminary
hearings precludes a defendant, both by Utah State Constitutional authority and, as a
result of that authority, by common practice, from adequately or, perhaps more important,
appropriately and sufficiently confronting and cross-examining a witness in at least an
~

approximation of cross-examination at trial. Defense counsel objected to introduction of
Estrada's testimony on the basis that the motive to cross-examine at preliminary hearing,
was, and is, often entirely different from that at trial.

Admitting that there was an

"opportunity" to cross examine Estrada, Mr. Goins defense counsel stated,
... that under 801 (b )( 1)(b) it specifically states that you had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect examination
and in these preliminary hearings there is an abbreviated procedure and
quite frankly, Your Honor, the motive in developing testimony is different
at a preliminary hearing than it is at trial. We frequently ask questions
19

during preliminary hearings that we would not ask at trial because evidence
is admissible at . . . preliminary hearing but not necessarily admissible at
trial. The rules of evidence are different and - or, or by the same token, we
don't ask question that we might ask at a trial because credibility
determinations are not being made at preliminary hearing. The Court
making the probable cause determination is not assessing the credibility of
a witness, therefore we do not ask those questions to get that information
out. So I don't believe that the motive of developing that testimony is the
same at a preliminary hearing as it would be at trial ...
R.166:10 (emphasis added).
The context and manner in which a defense attorney might cross-examine a
witness during the course of a jury trial is likely to be very different from the manner in
which cross-examination takes place, if allowed by the court, during preliminary hearing.
It is simply inaccurate to give a blanket imprimatur upon preliminary hearing testimony,
as the nature of a preliminary hearing is extremely different from that of a jury trial, or
even of a bench trial. The preliminary hearing is constitutionally intended solely to be for
the purpose of establishing probable cause. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 as amended
1995. The Court of Appeals' warning in Goins to defense counsel to be prescient ("It
may behoove defense counsel in such cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to
cross-examine such witnesses,") Goins at n. 7., is essentially a directive for counsel to
obtain a crystal ball. Given the fact that, in any given case, defense counsel may be
completely precluded by the particular magistrate judge from cross-examining the
witness on the basis that such examination will not assist the court in establishing
probable cause, the effort to become a seer may be entirely wasted. Many judges take the
position that if cross-examination is not in furtherance of establishing probable cause it is
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objectionable and will, even sua sponte, disallow questioning beyond what may assist in
@

establishing probable cause for a bind-over. "How does that help establish probable
cause(?)," is a commonly asked question.

Other judges will of course sustain a

prosecutor's objection on the basis that a question goes beyond the scope of establishing
probable cause.

There is no constitutional right to confrontation of witnesses at

preliminary hearings. State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, , 13, 218 P.3d 590. Reliable
hearsay is allowed, evidence of prior bad acts, bad character evidence, and various
matters which would be entirely extraneous at trial, may come in to evidence without
objection, for the very reason that the preliminary hearing has such a limited
~

constitutional purpose.
For confrontation purposes, throughout Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
reference is made throughout to the "opportunity to cross-examine", rather than actual
cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. passim. The "prior testimony exception" to the
exclusion of out-of-court statements, specifically preliminary hearing testimony, applies
"only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Id., 541 U.S. at
57. Many State courts, however, have considered motive in determining whether to
allow preliminary hearing testimony at trial. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 32 Mass. App.
Ct. 570, 574-75, 591 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (1992)("In order to establish reliability, '[t]he
prior testimony of the currently unavailable witness must have been given 'in a
proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues as in the current proceeding, with

@

reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-
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examination of the declarant by the party against whom the testimony is . . . offered,"'
Quoting Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 393 Mass. at 532); State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524,

@

528-29, 328 P.3d 504, 508-09 (2014) (Identifying three non-exhaustive indicators of an
"adequate

opportunity,"

determined

case-by-case,

for

cross-examination:

1.

representation by counsel, 2. no significant limitation in any way in the scope or nature
of cross-examination, 3. no new and significantly material line of cross-examination that
was not touched upon in the preliminary hearing."); People v. Zapien, 4 Cal. 4th 929,
975, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 147, 846 P.2d 704, 729 (1993) (A defendant's motive for
cross-examining a witness during a preliminary hearing will differ from the motive for
cross-examining that witness at trial. To be admissible at trial, these motives must be at

@

least "similar."). In the instant matter, counsel conducted cross-examination of Estrada
for discovery purposes but did not bother to object to testimony at the preliminary
hearing. Estrada's statement that he moved out from living with Mr. Goins when his
"bike ended up missing," R.202:16, strongly inferred that Mr. Goins stole it.

This

evidence, to which counsel objected at trial, R. was very objectionable, which defense
counsel raised in terms of "evidentiary admissibility," the stolen bike inference, R.167 :3,
to which the State responded, R.167:12. The prior "bad act" evidence may very well
have had a substantial impact on the decision of the jury. The trial court allowed it,

@

R.167: 16-17, and the Court of Appeals did not address the issue at all in its decision.
This was error of a significant magnitude and raises the question of why some
mechanism was not sought by the court to excise this particular statement from the
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(i)

recording played for the jury. Certainly it would not have been allowed had the witness
@

been present, no curative jury instruction could have ameliorated the problem, and it
badly eroded Mr. Goins' right of confrontation to have reasonably untainted testimony
from a prior proceeding to be presented to the jury. Prior cross-examination must not
only be full, but also fair. See discussion infra. For purposes or reiterating the testimony
of Estrada at trial, therefore, prior cross-examination in the area of this prior bad act was
not fair. It was error not to require that it be excluded.
There are those jurisdictions, including case law in Utah, which have adopted a
per se rule, e.g., State v. Brooks, infra. In rejecting such a position, the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated,
Some courts have adopted a per se rule that preliminary hearing testimony
is admissible in a subsequent trial if the unavailability and opportunity to
cross-examine requirements are satisfied. See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537
(Utah 1981) (cross-examination at trial and at preliminary hearing in same
case take place under same motive and interest as matter of law); see also
State v. Massengill, 99 N.M. 283,657 P.2d 139 (App.1983). These courts
treat the "motive" issue primarily, if not entirely, as one of law. We decline
to adopt such a rule, although it would be much easier for trial courts to
apply.

State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 862-63, 840 P.2d 400, 406-07 (Ct. App. 1992). The Idaho
court in Ricks concluded that a case-by-case determination would allow the trial court to
determine, as a matter of fact, whether the party opposing the use of such testimony "had
an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination."
@

Ricks 840 P .2d at 407.

It should be pointed out that the Utah case

referenced by Ricks in the above quotation, State v. Brooks, utilized the "sufficient
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indicia of reliability" of the hearsay test. 638 P2d at 539. Brooks was decided well before

Crawford v. Washington overruled Ohio v. Roberts on that very issue. "The Roberts test

@

allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere
judicial determination of reliability.

It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed

method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is very
different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a
surrogate means of assessing reliability." Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. at 62. Since
the Brooks decision was heavily rooted in the type of "reliability" determination, which
Crawford soundly rejected in abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, the viability of Brooks and its
per se determination of motive is heavily in doubt at the present time.
There are numerous cases which hold that cross-examination at preliminary
hearing need not be identical to that at trial, the opportunity must be "sufficient."

State v. Outlaw, 216 Conn. 492, 499, 582 A.2d 751, 755 (1990)(using the rejected Ohio
v. Roberts "reliability" test); People v. Zapien, supra, 846 P.2d at 729; Commonwealth v.
Blazemore, 531 Pa. 582, 588, 614 A.2d 684, 687 (1992)["(T)he standard to be applied is
that of full and fair opportunity to cross-examine."].
More recent authority, however, has taken a different approach, particularly
where, as in Utah, the preliminary hearing is confined to establishing probable cause.

@

Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 ("Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
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preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence ..."). The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
the following:
In Wisconsin, a defendant has a statutory right at a preliminary hearing to
cross-examine witnesses against him. Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5). However, the
scope of that cross-examination is limited to issues of plausibility, not
credibility. State ex rel. Huser v. Rasmussen, 84 Wis. 2d 600, 614, 267
N.W.2d 285 (1978). This is because the preliminary hearing "is intended
to be a summary proceeding to determine essential or basic facts" relating
to probable cause, not a ''full evidentiary trial on the issue ofguilt beyond a
reasonable doubt."
State v. Dunn, 121 Wis. 2d 389, 396-97, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984)(emphasis added).
Further clarifying, a more recent post-Crawford Wisconsin case stated,
Cross-examination at a preliminary examination is not to be used ''for the
purpose of exploring the general trustworthiness of the witness." Huser, 84
Wis. 2d at 614. Indeed, "[t]hat kind of attack is off limits in a preliminary
hearing setting." State v. Sturgeon, 231 Wis. 2d 487, 499, 605 N.W.2d 589
(Ct. App. 1999). When this restriction is enforced, as it was in the present
case, and the State attempts to use the preliminary hearing testimony at a
later trial, a Confrontation Clause problem arises.
State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ,I,I30-31, 279 Wis. 2d 659, 673, 695 N.W.2d 259, 26566(emphasis added). This highlights a pragmatic dilemma which dogs defense attorneys
@

who wish to fully cross-examine but do not wish to push the preliminary hearing judge,
or the prosecuting attorney, too far and have it cut off. The question is, how does one
know if "full and fair cross-examination" will be allowed in a particular case without
overstepping one's bounds? Defense attorneys are often walking on eggshells to ensure
the magistrate judge does not cut them off and will truncate or curtail their examination
accordingly.

25

Exploring areas of bias, motive to lie, and lack of credibility, matters not
associated with "plausibility," are generally off limits in preliminary hearings in Utah,

Ci

which brings up an interesting equal protection issue. If some magistrates allow full and
fair cross-examination and hew to a strict construction of Art I, § 12, such an arbitrary
and capricious application of the Utah Constitution and the Rules of Evidence violates
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
requirement of the uniform operation of laws, Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. The uniform
operation of laws clause "is at least as rigorous as the federal guarantee." State v.

Houston, supra, ,I41, citing, inter alia, State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ,l33 n.5, 233 P.3d 476;
accord Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, il 33, 54 P.3d 1069 (Sup.Ct.).

®

Thus, presumably only analysis under Utah Const. Art. I, § 24 of the Utah
Constitution is required. Whatever the case may be, given that hundreds of preliminary
hearings are held each year in Utah, some magistrates and/or prosecutors allowing
considerable latitude in cross-examination, some hewing to the principle that only the
depths of plausibility and not credibility may be plumbed, there is a considerable question
as to whether criminal defendants, separated into differing classes (those allowed full and
fair cross examination with similar motive and interest, and those who are denied the
opportunity) are being treated discriminatorily and the law, specifically Utah Const. Art.
I, § 12, is being applied in a non-unifonn fashion, denying equal protection.
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. Art. I, §
24. As was long ago explained,
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"A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or
exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation
between classes or subject matter included as compared to those excluded
from its operation, provided the differentiation bears a reasonable relation
to the purposes to be accomplished by the act.
"In order to see whether the excluded classes or transactions are on a
different basis than those included, we must look at the purpose of the act.
The objects and purposes of a law present the touchstone for determining
proper and improper classifications.
"It is only where some persons or transactions excluded from the operation
of the law are as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation that the law is discriminatory in the
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. If a reasonable basis to
differentiate tho.se included from those excluded from its operation can be
found, it must be held constitutional."

State v. J.B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 530, 116 P.2d 766, 769 (Sup.Ct. 1941)
quoting State V. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 923, 924, 117 A. L. R. 330 (Sup.Ct.
1938). This presents an extremely difficult issue to preserve at the trial level and should
be considered. The fact cannot be ignored, however, that there is no rational basis for
any differentiation between those who are allowed sufficient opportunity for crossexamination at preliminary hearing and those who are not. The Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees all citizens equal protection of the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 as does
Utah Const. Art. I, § 24. For this reason alone, preliminary hearing testimony, which was
@

obtained contrary to the strictures of the United States and State Constitutions, should be
disallowed at trial.
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People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004) presents the argument which Goins

believes is the most persuasive in this area. A copy of People v. Fry is included in
Addendum I. Some, not all, of the reasoning of Fry is set forth as follows:
A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of
probable cause. The rights of the defendant are therefore curtailed:
evidentiary and procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to crossexamine witnesses and to introduce evidence are limited to the question of
probable cause.
A defendant has no constitutional right to unrestricted confrontation of
witnesses and to introduce evidence at a preliminary hearing. By rule,
defendants have the right to a preliminary hearing under certain
circumstances, and pursuant to the rule a defendant 'may cross-examine
witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf.' Crim.
P. 7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is not intended to be a minitrial or to afford the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery.
Hence, a preliminary hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a
trial.
Additionally, the judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a
determination of probable cause. A judge may not engage in credibility
determinations unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law .... if it
is "in conflict with nature or fully established or conceded facts. It is
testimony as to facts which the witness physically could not have observed
or events that could not have happened under the laws of nature." Aside
from the exceptionally rare instance of credibility as an issue of law,
defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage in credibility inquiries
and may be prohibited from doing so. Thus, the right to cross-examination
may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances.
Because credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard,
once a prima facie case for probable cause is established, there is little
defense counsel can do to show that probable cause does not exist.
Therefore, as a practical matter, defense counsel may decline to crossexamine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, understanding that the crossexamination would have no bearing on the issue of probable cause and that
the judge may limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus we conclude
that the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is very
limited. Further, the opportunity for cross-examination regarding the
28
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credibility of a witness, as a matter of fact, exists only to the extent that an
attorney persists in asking questions that have no bearing on the issues
before the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited by the
court.

People v. Fry, 92 P.3d at 977(intemal citations omitted).

"Thus," the Fry court

concluded, "we have held that the preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation
Clause requirements." Id. "(W)e do not wish to change the scope of the preliminary
hearing by overruling our decision in Smith that a preliminary hearing does not provide
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. As the Attorney General recognized in
oral argument, Smith is good law; it prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a
mini-trial which would expend time and resources the judiciary does not possess." Id. at
978.
Considering the issue in the context of judicial resources, if every preliminary
hearing becomes a "mini-trial," there may be little time left for judges to conduct actual
trials. Bound separately as an Appendix is a printout obtained from Utah Court Data
Services on October 21, 2016. There are 20,073 entries, virtually all felonies, for cases in
<i

2015, wherein preliminary hearings were scheduled. The explanatory e-mail indicates
that column F reflects the date the preliminary hearing was scheduled to be heard. If it
was cancelled, column E indicates the date it was cancelled and column G reflects the
reason.

As is evident, few of those scheduled for hearing were cancelled.

As the

explanatory e-mail indicates, unless column E indicates the hearing was cancelled, it took
place on the date indicated in column F (it is possible that the data does not indicate
whether or not the preliminary hearing was held or waived). The vast majority of those
29

preliminary hearings, as reflected in column F, took place as scheduled, approximately
70-75%.1 Assuming roughly 15,000 preliminary hearings resulted in mini-trials wherein

~

full and fair cross-examination, going to every facet of a witness' credibility and such
sundry other matters as defense counsel wished to preserve for trial were to be allowed,
somewhere in the vicinity of 45,000 hours of judicial time would be consumed.2 That is
not an unfair estimate considering that counsel often forgo cross-examination of most
witnesses entirely, as cross-examination would be both premature and would serve no
useful purpose in frustrating the prosecution's ability to establish probable cause.
Whether or not these figures and speculations are precise, it is entirely evident that it is
impractical to allow full and fair cross-examination of each witness in every preliminary

@

hearing held.
There seems to be at least some agreement in the Court of Appeals that the issue is
unsettling. See State v. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ~ 17 n.3 ["(W)e are also not convinced
that a preliminary hearing always provides the opportunity for cross-examination
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.... "].
The State would have it both ways: a criminal defendant is provided the
"opportunity" to fully and fairly confront the witness at preliminary hearing yet the
purpose of a preliminary hearing is solely for the purpose of establishing probable cause.
Those are diametrically opposed propositions. The two can only be reconciled if the

1 . Counsel's best guess.
2 . Again, just a conjecture on the part of counsel. An average of three hours per
preliminary hearing would likely be required.
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preliminary hearing court chooses to allow defense counsel ample latitude to cross~

examine in areas which may have nothing to do with establishing probable cause. Even
then, it is questionable whether that sort of "opportunity" satisfies the needs of defense
counsel when it comes time to cross-examine a witness before a jury at trial.
Oftentimes, certainly more often than not, discovery is in its seminal stages. In
order to meaningfully cross-examine, counsel must have all the information which would
be available at trial. It is very troubling that one would feel compelled to cross-examine

i)

to the fullest extent possible, perhaps bringing forth inadmissible testimony or otherwise
unfavorable testimony, without the benefit of discovery which would later be produced
i>

prior to trial.

One court has determined that, "The adequacy of the opportunity to

confront will be decided on a case-by-case basis, turning upon the discovery available to
the defendant at the time and the manner in which the magistrate judge allows the crossexamination to proceed." Chavez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 337, 213 P.3d 476, 482 (2009).
One must wonder how practical that is in terms of judicial resources. And again, it
second guesses defense counsel, as well as the magistrate, to a considerable degree.
With respect to rulings on hearsay, legal questions regarding admissibility are
reviewed for correctness, questions of fact ... for clear error, and the final ruling on
admissibility for abuse of discretion. State v. Garrido, supra, 314 P.3d at ,r 10. The Court
of Appeals erred in finding that the witness was unavailable and that counsel had an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine at preliminary hearing, thus permitting admission
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of the preliminary hearing testimony of Gabriel Estrada. For the reasons set forth, this
Court should reverse and remand for a new trial.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING RAISING NEW ARGUMENTS THAT TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

A. FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF SELF-DEFENSE INSTRUCTION.

The recorded preliminary hearing testimony of the victim of the Threatening with
a Dangerous Weapon charge, Gabriel Estrada, R.202:2 - 13, was played for the jury. R.
167:149. The defendant's cross-examination of Mr. Estrada raised no factual support for
or issues of self-defense whatsoever. R.202: 9 - 13. Thus, this point goes only to Counts
I and II of the Amended Information.
The testimony of the primary victim, Jacob Omar, first brought forth the issue of
self-defense on the part of the defendant during the State's direct examination. Factually,
it arose on direct examination with the victim, Mr. Omar, indicating he was being
questioned by Mr. Goins and his friend, Star, and that Mr. Omar was the initial aggressor:
Next thing I knew just because being waken up in the middle of the
afternoon to this nonsense, I see Desean stepping onto my blanket. I don't
allow anybody to step onto my blanket. So I got up and I pushed him off
my blankets.
R.167:124-125.
accordingly.

The defendant was then placed in a defensive position and reacted

R.167: 125-6.

While the defense elaborated on the issue during cross-

examination, R.167:140-145, 146-150, the initial and primary testimony with respect to
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the defendant's defense of self-defense was raised and developed by the State in its direct
@

examination. R.167:124-139,145-146.
The trial court ruled that sufficient evidence of self-defense was present to entitle
the defendant to instruct the jury on the issue. R.167:217-218.3 During discussion of the
proposed jury instructions, the subject arose of defendant's requested instruction
discussing the burden and weight, inter alia, relative to self-defense.

R.60, defense

requested instruction is attached as Addendum J. The State objected to the instruction,
but defense counsel insisted that it should be given as is. R.167:228-231. The trial court
gave the instruction as written, "over the State's objection." R.167:231. The instruction,
@

R.102, No. 24, is attached as Addendum K.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE MERITS OF
THE PETITION FOR REHEARING.
This subsection responds to the question of whether a petition for rehearing is an
appropriate vehicle for addressing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, including
prior appellate counsel.
Utah R. App. P. Rule 35 states in pertinent part, "the petition (for rehearing) shall
state with particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has
overlooked or misapprehended . . . ."

@

There was no claim that the Court

3 "It is a subtle nuance but I am finding that there has been evidence that Omar pushed
the defendant, that he was angry, he was intense, even his own admissions is that he was
angry and that under the circumstances the defense has described which they may argue
to the jury and it's for the trier of fact to determine if those are the circumstances, that at
one point the defendant was on the bottom and Omar was on top and that is sufficient
for some evidence to warrant the self-defense instruction." R.167:217-218.
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"misapprehended" anything which was presented.

The claim was that, due to the

ineffective assistance of counsel of previously appointed appellate counsel, the Court of

(i}

Appeals "overlooked" an important issue. The rule itself places no restrictions upon
why, i.e., the underlying reasons, the court may have "overlooked" an issue. It simply
allows the consideration of something which was overlooked.
The Petition for Rehearing itself was fully supported by the record, consistent with
the record and briefing of the facts before this Court. It involved no extraneous facts, and
provided the Petitioner with the guarantee of a meaningful appeal of the issue briefed in
the Petition for Rehearing, and allowed the Court of Appeals ample latitude to provide
for such further briefing and argument as desired.

@

The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the merits of the Petition for Rehearing
because the Petitioner has stated with particularity the points of law and fact, all
contained within the record on appeal, which the Petitioner claimed the Court had
"overlooked."

It was the responsibility of Mr. Goins' initial appellate counsel to bring

the matters to the court's attention.

"The very premise of our adversary system of

criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free." United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045 (1984).

Failing to provide

@

adversarial testing as to a single issue, when that issue is critical to a finding of guilt, may
in itself produce a breakdown in the adversarial process. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 664.
"Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial
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a reliable adversarial testing process." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104
@)

Sup. Ct. 2052 (1984).

Appellate counsel failed to "bring to bear such skill and

knowledge as will render the (appeal) a reliable adversarial testing process." Id.
The result of prior appellate counsel's ineffective assistance is that the Court of
Appeals was caused to "overlook" the specific issue involved. Refusal of the court to
rule on the Petition for Rehearing was a denial of the defendant's right to effective
appellate counsel on appeal. The petitioner enjoys a constitutional right to appeal arising
from article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255,
1256 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1996) citing State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah Sup.Ct.
@

1985)("The Utah Constitution provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution shall
have a "right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const. art. I, § 12."). He is entitled to have
counsel appointed and paid for at the appellate level. "The cost of appointed counsel for
a party found to be indigent, including the cost of counsel and expense of the first appeal,
shall be paid by the county in which the trial court proceedings are held." Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-1111. It goes without saying that the Petitioner is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel. Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, 1 48, 279 P.3d 396, 409 (Sup.Ct.);

Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350, 111, 293 P.3d 1092, 1096. "The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures criminal defendants a right to effective assistance
of appellate counsel." Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, 139, 175 P.3d 530, 539 (Sup.Ct.)4.

@

4 For this proposition Lafferty cites Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah
Sup.Ct. 1996), which states as follows:
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Initial defense counsel's error was caught early enough in the appellant process
that the Court of Appeals could of swiftly and effectively dealt with the matter. This

@

presented an excellent reason to litigate the issue in the Court of Appeals, rather than put
it off to this Court, or more so, a post-conviction proceeding under the PCRA, assuming
the defendant could obtain counsel to handle the matter or attempt to do it pro se (always,
at the least, problematic).
Because the practical effect of a refusal by the Court of Appeals to entertain the
merits of the Petition for Rehearing was to deny the effective assistance of counsel at that
stage, the defendant timely brought the issue to the Court of Appeals' attention as a
matter which, through no fault of its own, the court had "overlooked." Mr. Goins would
be severely prejudiced by having to raise the issues presented in a subsequent proceeding
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Because Mr. Goins, who is indigent, would

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the
right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985). The standard
for judging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as
the standard for judging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 826
P .2d 651 (Utah 1991 ); see also Tillman v. Cook, 85 5 P .2d 211, 221
(Utah 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed.
2d 671 (1994); State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
Under that standard, a defendant must show that his counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable conduct
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Tillman,
855 P.2d at 221 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)).
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not be entitled to counsel as a matter of right pursuant to a Post-Conviction Petition, his
@

ability to even raise the issue presented at all would be severely limited, if not denied
altogether.
Furthermore, there are legitimate policy reasons for hearing the matter at the
appellate court level, while it is still ripe, rather than shuffling it down the road with the
hope that some good-hearted lawyer will take up the issue pro bono in a PCRA setting.
The Sixth Amendment requires that an appellant be provided the effective
assistance of counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed.
2d 821 ( 1985)5. The Petitioner timely raised that issue in the Court of Appeals. It is not

@

necessary for the Court of Appeals to detour from the direct application of Utah R. App.
P. Rule 35. The issue was "overlooked" by the Court. The reason it was overlooked is
precisely why Mr. Goins was required to request a rehearing. His right to counsel was
abridged by his original appellate attorney. Rehearing was the efficient, fair, just, and
judicially economic forum for the issue presented to be heard. Rehearing should have

5 "In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is
attempting to demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of
liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an
adversary proceeding that -- like a trial -- is governed by intricate rules that to a
layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant -- like an
unrepresented defendant at trial -- is unable to protect the vital interests at stake.
To be sure, respondent did have nominal representation when he brought this
appeal. But nominal representation on an appeal as of right -- like nominal
representation at trial -- does not suffice to render the proceedings constitutionally
adequate; a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective representation is in
no better position than one who has no counsel at all."

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. at 396.
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been granted.
This Court addressed this very issue, in the context of a petition for certiorari,

~

where the issue of prior appellate counsel's ineffective assistance was raised for the first
time on certiorari. The Court held that, while unusual, it should hear the issue. It stated
as follows:
The State is correct that ordinarily a claim of ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel must be raised in a postconviction proceeding, as provided for in
rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Obviously, such a proceeding
would usually be the first opportunity to advance that claim. However, this
case presents the unusual situation where the claim of ineffectiveness of
appellate counsel is being raised in a second tier of appellate review by new
appellate counsel. If we were to require defendant to present the claim of
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel in a postconviction
proceeding in the trial court, we are not aware of any evidence or
argument which might be made that is not now before us. We therefore
conclude that in these peculiar, narrow circumstances, we should now
address defendant's claim and not require him to raise it later in a
postconviction proceeding in the trial court. Judicial economy will be
served thereby. (Emphasis added).

State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah Sup.Ct. 199l){emphasis added).
Furthermore, rehearing is not inconsistent with current practice under Utah R.
App. P. Rule 23B. "A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to
remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate
court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."

Id.

That

mechanism .is available in order to expose the inadequacies of counsel at the trial level
even after the matter is on appeal. There is nothing inconsistent then with giving similar
consideration to an error made by appellate counsel timely brought to the Court's
attention at the appellate level on a petition for rehearing. Compared to a Rule 23B
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remand, evidentiary hearing in the trial court, and revisiting the issue on appeal, it is far
~

less time consuming, requires

no additional

fact

finding,

and provides the

defendant/appellant the constitutional guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel
throughout his appeal.
Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in granting a petition for
certiorari in State v. Humphries, supra, 818 P.2d at 1029, and for the reasons stated in the
premises, Court of Appeals should have granted a rehearing and ruled on the merits of
Mr. Goins' Petition for Rehearing.

C. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24 IS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF THE
LAW WHICH MISLED THE JURY AND PREJUDICED THE
DEFENDANT.
Whether jury instructions correctly state the law is a question of law. State v.
Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ,r 6, 122 P.3d 566. Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness.
State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186,

,r 8, 355 P.3d 1078.

Mr. Goins' initial appellate counsel

in the Court of Appeals failed to raise this issue, which undersigned counsel then
requested the Court of Appeals address by way of his Petition for Rehearing.
Jury instruction No. 24 states as follows:
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to
establish self defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.
The laws of Utah do require the defendant to bring forward some evidence
which tends to show self-defense. If the defendant has done this, and if
such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or
if it raises a reason to believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, then
you must find him not guilty. (Emphasis added)
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an
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acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt.
R. l 03 (emphasis added). The emphasized language constitutes an incorrect statement of
the law.
Contrary to this jury instruction, the defendant bears no burden whatsoever to

®

establish self-defense. This Court has stated, "(t)he trial court made clear that Jackson
did not bear the burden to establish self-defense and that 'if there was a reasonable doubt
as to whether [the] defendant did or did not act in self-defense, then the jury should
acquit."' Jackson v. State, 2014 UT App 168, 14, 332 P.3d 398, 400 citing State v. Knoll,
712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985). The defense has no burden to present any factual basis
of self-defense whatsoever. Whether the facts establishing self-defense come from the
State's case or from the defendant's is immaterial. Either the facts are present, regardless
of their genesis, or they are not. The law was made clear in State v. Knoll:
In sum, when there is a basis in the evidence, whether the evidence is
produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, which would provide
some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was done to
protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, an
instruction on self-defense should be given the jury. And if the issue is
raised, whether by the defendant's or the prosecution's evidence, the
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
killing was not in self-defense. State v. Starks, Utah, 627 P.2d 88, 92
(1981); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d at 695; State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68
(1977). (emphasis added)

State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214.

The instruction in Knoll indicated that, "if the

prosecution's evidence did not tend to show self-defense, then the defendant must "bring
forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense" to avail himself of that
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defense." Id. at 215. That is not what trial counsel's proposed instruction stated here. It
@

stated blankly and inaccurately that, "The laws of Utah to require the defendant to bring
forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense." R.60. The trial court used
that very instruction. R.103. Its language places the burden solely upon the defendant to
bring forward self-defense evidence. The defendant bears no such burden. The law
plainly requires the State to prove the defendant's guilt, including eradicating any
reasonable doubt as to the defense of self-defense, regardless of the source of any facts
supporting that defense. Of course, as the Court in Knoll further noted,
As a practical matter, a defendant may have to assume the burden of
producing some evidence of self-defense if there is no evidence in the
prosecution's case that would provide some kind of evidentiary foundation
for a claim of self-defense. But there need only be "sufficient evidence of
[the defendant's] justification to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable
doubt of his culpability for the offense charged" to justify the giving of an
instruction on the point. State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P. 145, 147 &
148 (1921). See also State v. Starks, supra, at 92; State v. Torres, 619 P.2d
at 695. If the jury concludes that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a
defendant acted in self-defense, he is entitled to an acquittal. State v.
Wilson, Utah, 565 P .2d 66 (1977); State v. Jackson, Utah, 528 P .2d 145
(1974).

Knoll, 712 P .2d at 215. The Court in Knoll concluded its holding on the issue with this
black letter statement of the law:
The trial court made clear in its instructions that the defendant had no
burden to adduce evidence of self-defense for the defense to be considered;
that the jury should consider the defense of self-defense, whether the
evidence thereof was presented by the prosecution or the defendant; that
the burden of proof remained on the prosecution throughout the case; and
that if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt about whether defendant
acted in self-defense, it should acquit. On the basis of these instructions, we
conclude that there was no error. (Emphasis added)
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Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215 (emphasis added); accord State v. Low, 2008 UT 58,

,r 25,

192

P.3d 867 ("When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a particular

@

affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence has been
presented--either by the prosecution or by the defendant--that provides any reasonable
@

basis upon which a jury could conclude that the affirmative defense applies to the
defendant."); State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133,

,r 74,

352 P.3d 107 ("The instruction

clearly conveyed that the jury should consider any evidence of self-defense, that the
burden of proof remained with the State at all stages of the trial, and that if the jury
entertained a reasonable doubt about whether defendant acted in self-defense, it should
acquit."); Jackson v. State, 2014 UT App 168,

,r 4, 332 P.3d 398 {"The trial court made

clear that Jackson did not bear the burden to establish self-defense and that 'if there was a
reasonable doubt as to whether [the] defendant did or did not act in self-defense, then the
jury should acquit."'); State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38,

,r

15, 248 P.3d 70 ("Rather, a

defendant is entitled to an affirmative defense instruction so long as there is a reasonable
basis in the evidence for such a defense.").
Many states agree with the proposition that if the jury is not instructed clearly on
the burden of proof of self-defense, the omission constitutes plain error.6 Here the jury

6 See e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 27 V.I. 332, 949 F.2d 677, 680
(3rd Cir. 1991) (applying Virginia state law); Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 675
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Janes, 982 P.2d 300,303,304 (Colo. 1999); Coley
v. State, 220 Ga. App. 468, 469 S.E.2d 513, 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Raines v.
State, 79 Haw. 219, 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Haw. 1995); State v. Evans, 278 Md.
197, 362 A.2d 629, 635 (Md. 1976); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684,
352 N.E.2d 203, 206-08 (Mass. 1976); Infantolino v. State, 414 A.2d 793, 795-97
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may well have concluded that, since the defendant did not "bring forward" the facts
@

constituting self-defense in the first instance, rather those facts were brought forward by
the State in its direct examination, that the defense was not entitled to such a defense.

D. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
Ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.

Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,

,r 56,

150 P.3d 480. Counsel's deficient performance

must be prejudicial - i.e., affecting the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT
76, ,r 19, 12 P.3d 92.
The record in the trial court reflects that the self-defense jury instruction, which
Ci

was discussed at great length, was defective and would have been misleading to the jury.
R.167: 229-231. By requesting an instruction containing an incorrect and misleading
statement of the law regarding the burden in establishing self-defense, defense counsel
allowed the State a free pass in its burden to prove the defendant guilty. It has been held
that when obvious defenses are ignored in lieu of those which are ostensibly weaker, the
presumption of effective assistance of counsel may be overcome.

See, e.g., Gray v.

Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (C.A.7 1986). Defense counsel did not ignore self-defense
entirely, however, counsel ignored the importance of allowing the burden of bringing
~

(R.I. 1980); State v. Green, 538 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Barone v. State,
858 P.2d 27, 28-29 (Nev. 1993); State v. Parish, 1994 NMSC 72, 878 P.2d 988, 994-95,
118 N.M. 39 (N.M. 1994) and State v. Acosta, 1997 NMCA 35, 939 P.2d 1081, 1087-88,
123 N.M. 273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, 575 N.W.2d 658,
664-65 (N.D. 1998); State v. Summers, 120 Wn.2d 801, 846 P.2d 490, 499-501 (Wash.
1993).

State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ,r 19 n.6, 18 P.3d 1123.
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forth the supporting facts to be shouldered solely by the defendant. This was both
negligent and prejudicial and supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The possibility that counsel was employing some sort of strategy is simply
implausible under any of the circumstances of this case. It is understood that, in order to
overcome the presumption of that the apparent failure of counsel to request a jury
instruction, there must be a demonstrable "lack of any conceivable tactical basis for
counsel's actions." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Depriving
the defendant of what can only be considered an avenue of defense, by misplacing the
burden on the defendant to establish self-defense, is not a tactical decision. It is a default,
a failure which falls below a reasonably objective standard of professionalism.
Accordingly,

"counsel's

deficient

performance

prejudiced

the

@

defense."

Litherland, , 19. The likelihood of a different. outcome is sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the verdict. See State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,, 23, 248 P.3d 984. In
consequence of which, the defendant should be entitled to a new trial.
E. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL.

Appellate counsel argued only one issue in his brief on appeal: "Whether the trial
court erred in finding witness Estrada unavailable under Rule 804 and pennitting his
preliminary hearing testimony." See Brief of Appellant, Argument, passim. Appellate
counsel did not raise the issue of the flawed self-defense instruction.
It is the law that counsel's failures on appeal, which prejudices a criminal

defendant on appeal, are cognizable under the standard set forth in Strickland v.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A person convicted of a crime is
@

entitled to effective assistance of counsel in his first appeal of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 394, 105 S. Ct. 830, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985). The general standard for judging
performance of counsel established in Strickland also applies to claims of ineffective
appellate counsel. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d
756 (2000). To prevail on a claim that appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
it must be shown that appellate counsel unreasonably failed to discover and assert a nonfrivolous issue and establish a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on this
issue on appeal but for his counsel's deficient representation. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285-86.
This Court has stated,
If trial counsel's deficiencies were prejudicial, appellate counsel's failure to
raise those deficiencies is necessarily prejudicial in the same way and to the
same extent. The prejudice from Landry's claim that appellate counsel was
deficient in failing to assert on appeal trial counsel's ineffective
representation is therefore implicit in his argument that he was prejudiced
by trial counsel's deficient performance. Thus, Landry has pleaded a prima
facie case of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and it was error to
dismiss that aspect of his petition for failure to state a claim.
Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350,

1 11,

293 P.3d 1092. To establish a meritorious

claim based on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the defendant must
demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, that this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his trial,
and that the appellate counsel failed to raise the issue. See Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011
UT 73,

1 41

n.5, 267 P.3d 232 ("with respect to each prong of Strickland a habeas

petitioner arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise a claim on appeal
45

must demonstrate ( 1) that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was obvious
from the trial record and (2) that the issue is one which probably would have resulted in

@

reversal on appeal.); Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ,r 44, 293 P.3d 345 ("And [a]s is the case
in challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel, to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must prove that appellate counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonable conduct and that the
deficient performance prejudiced [him]." (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40,

,r 211, 344 P.3d 581. ("(T)he Strickland

two-part test applies. But we have further held that where a petitioner argues that
appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim, the petitioner

@

"must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether appellate
counsel overlooked an issue which is obvious from the trial record and . . . which
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal.).
F. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE ON THE MERITS, REVERSE
AND REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT.

In the instant matter, for the reasons above stated, appellate counsel's conduct fell
below the standard of practice required of defense counsel in failing to bring to bear the
skill and expertise required of defense counsel, and was therefore deficient. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. The likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high

to undermine confidence in the verdict. See State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,

,r 23, 248

P.3d 984. In this regard, it should be borne in mind precisely what the standard is:
(T)houghtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome may be
46

@

undermined at some point substantially short of the "more probable than
not" portion of the spectrum.
State v. Knight, 734 P .2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). The likelihood of a different result

"more probable than not" in this particular case. "To merit reversal of his conviction, (a
defendant) must also demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by trial counsel's
deficient performance-that there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result
absent the error. State v. Liti, supra, 2015 UT App at 121. It is clear that both trial and
@

appellate counsels' error prejudiced the defendant. Trial and appellate counsels' error
created a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome sufficiently high to undermine
confidence in the verdict and this Court's decision to require reversal and a new trial.
This Court should reverse and remand this matter for a new trial because of the erroneous
jury instruction.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Desean Michael Goins respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the Court of Appeals convictions of Aggravated Assault and remand
@))

the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

A

day of _ _ _

--...b_--"---·

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ORME, Judge:

1. Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a member

of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court, but
thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on this
case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). Judge Davis, a member
of this court from 1993 until late in 2015 when he became a
senior judge, passed away on February 27, 2016. Judge Davis
was twice our presiding judge and three times our
representative on the Judicial Council. More importantly, he was
an esteemed colleague and good friend. His wit, wisdom, and
dedication will be sorely missed.

State v. Goins

'Ill
Desean Michael Goins (Defendant) was convicted of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and threatening with or
using a dangerous weapon in a fight, a class A misdemeanor, see
id. § 76-10-506. 2 Defendant now appeals both convictions,
arguing that the trial court erroneously found that a witness was
unavailable and allowed the witness's prior testimony to be used
against Defendant on that basis. Because there was no error in
the trial court's determination of unavailability, and because
Defendant had the opporhmity to cross-examine the witness
when he gave his prior testimony, we affirm.

BACKGROUND
':1(2
One morning in July 2013, Defendant and his girlfriend
set off on a search in downtown Salt Lake City with a very
specific goal: to find a homeless man (Witness) whom Defendant
believed had stolen his cell phone. They found Witness outside a
homeless shelter for men. With knife in hand, Defendant
confronted Witness, who denied taking the phone and hurried
away.
'Il3
The couple then made their way to Pioneer Park, a
traditional haunt of Salt Lake's homeless denizens, where one of
Witness's friends (Victim), also a homeless man, was sleeping on
his blanket. Defendant's girlfriend woke Victim and asked if he
had seen Witness. Defendant, waving the knife he still carried,
complained that Witness had stolen his phone. When Defendant
2. Although some of the statutes cited in this opinion have been
amended since July 2013, when the incident giving rise to the
charges against Defendant occurred, the amendments do not
affect our analysis. Accordingly, for ease of reference we cite the
most recent codification of the statutes.
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encroached on Victim's personal space, Victim pushed
Defendant off the blanket. An altercation ensued, during which
Defendant bit off Victim's earlobe. Both men stood up and
squared off once again, and Defendant then retrieved his knife,
which he had dropped during the scuffle, and stabbed Victim
under the left arm. Soon thereafter, police arrived and arrested
Defendant. Defendant was later charged in connection with the
assault of Victim and the brandishing of the knife against
Witness. 3
<JI:4
Prior to the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked
Salt Lake City police bike patrols to locate Victim and Witness.
The officers were able to locate both men, who spent much of
their time together, "based primarily on a description of
[Victim's] missing earlobe," even though they did not have a
description of Witness. Victim and Witness arrived together at
the preliminary hearing with a pastor from a church both men
regularly visited. The prosecution seized the opportunity to keep
more regular contact with both men through the pastor, 4 a man
who had the trust of both Witness and Victim.

3. Defendant was also charged with-and acquitted of-the
felony of mayhem, nearly forgotten outside the confines of firstyear Criminal Law in law school. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105
(LexisNexis 2012) (Every person who unlawfully and
intentionally deprives a human being of a member of his body,
or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the
tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of
mayhem."). Despite the rarity of mayhem convictions in modem
times, they are not unheard of. See, e.g., State v. Fairclough, 44
P.2d 692, 692-93 (Utah 1935) (affirming conviction for mayhem).
4. By the time of the trial, the pastor had left the state for a new
position. Because both the pastor and his successor affirmed that
service was made on both Witness and Victim, and because the
(continued ... )
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':115
The prosecution regularly followed up with the pastor
and emailed him the trial information for him to pass along to
Witness and Victim. The pastor verified that the two men
received the notification. A few weeks before trial, the pastor
informed the prosecution that Witness had gotten into some
trouble, been jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving
this information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Witness
had already been released. From that time forth, neither Victim
nor the pastor, both of whom knew Witness well and could
recognize him by sight, saw or heard from Witness, and no one
saw Witness with his former friends or in his former hang-outs.
On the eve of trial, the prosecution contacted the jail to see if
Witness was incarcerated again, but he was not.
':116
Trial was scheduled to begin on October 23, 2013, but was
continued one day because no jury had been called for that date.
At that time, the prosecution asked the trial court to declare
Witness unavailable because Witness did not appear for trial and
the prosecution was unable to locate him. The prosecution also
asked the trial court to admit Witness's preliminary hearing
testimony during the trial. Over an objection raised by
Defendant's counsel that Witness "was not 'unavailable,"' the
trial court granted the motion and indicated that it would allow
the preliminary hearing testimony at the rescheduled trial. At
trial, which began the following day, the jury convicted
Defendant of aggravated assault, for the attack on Victim, and of
threatening with a dangerous weapon during a fight, for his
confrontation of Witness. Defendant appeals, and we affirm. 5
(... continued)
prosecution utilized the second pastor in the same manner as the
first, we use the pastor" when referring to either of the two
pastors.
II

5. Although Defendant apparently appeals both the conviction
related to the assault of Victim and the one for brandishing the
(continued ... )
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding
Witness to be unavailable under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and in permitting Witness's preliminary hearing
testimony to be admitted under that rule as prior testimony.
"We review the district court's evidentiary rulings under an
abuse of discretion standard. However, error in the district
court's evidentiary rulings will result in reversal only if the error
is harmful." Anderson v. LarnJ H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 2015 UT
App 134, en 17, 351 P.3d 832 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). "The district court's decision to admit testimony
that may implicate the confrontation clause is also a question of
law reviewed for correctness." State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, en 8, 232
P.3d 519.
<_117

ANALYSIS
en8
We note, preliminarily, that a statement is hearsay if
(1) the witness made the statement outside of the current trial or
hearing and (2) a party offers the statement "to prove the truth
of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(l)(2). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless an exception applies. See id.
R. 802. It is the interpretation and application of one such
(... continued)
knife against Witness, we agree with the State that Witness's
testimony was relevant only to the charge relating to Witness.
Witness was not a witness to the assault of Victim and offered no
testimony on that point at the preliminary hearing; therefore,
even were we to discern an error in the presentation of Witness's
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury-which we do not, see
infra enen 12-15, 18-20-we would still affirm Defendant's assault
conviction because the alleged error would be harmless as to
that charge.
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exception -the admission of prior testimony by an unavailable
potential witness-that we address in this opinion. See id. R.
804(b)(l).
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding That
Witness Was Unavailable.

19
Utah law requires that the party offering evidence in the
form of witness testimony make reasonable efforts to procure the
witness's testimony at trial. Id. R. 804(a)(5). "[C]onstitutional
unavailability is found only when it is 'practically impossible to
produce the witness in court.' ... [E]very reasonable effort must
be made to produce the witness." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
402 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted).
<_[10 But "[a] good faith search does not mean that every le.ad,
no matter how nebulous, must be tracked to the ends of the
earth." Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1974)
(determining that the prosecution was under no obligation to
investigate vague claims that one prosecution witness had
"moved to somewhere in the state of New York" and that
another "was said to have applied for employment with the
Santa Fe Railway in the 'midwest"'). In essence, although a party
must make every reasonable effort to procure the in-court
testimony of the witnesses that the party wishes to use, the party
is not, as the State puts it, required to do "everything humanly
possible" to do so. Thus, "Rule 804(a)(5) does not require a
patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential
witness ... whose physical location and address are completely
unknown." Brown v. Harry Heathman, Inc~, 744 P.2d 1016, 1018
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645--46
(Utah 1995) (holding that State's efforts to locate witness were
reasonable where it contacted United States Marshal's Office,
which had an outstanding warrant for arrest of witness, and
where federal officials "could not provide any concrete
information as to his present location, other than that he might
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be found in Mexico or southern California"), abrogated by statute
on other grounds as recognized by Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73,
'I[ 70, 267 P.3d 232.
<_[11 In State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we
concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to obtain two witnesses'
testimony were reasonable. In that case, the prosecution
subpoenaed the witnesses three times before trial; spoke with
and was assured of the presence of one witness at trial by that
witness's mother; visited the last known address of the other
witness, but discovered that the witness had moved without
leaving a forwarding address; questioned police informants; and
searched police files for evidence of the whereabouts of the
missing witness. Id. at 893. Under such circumstances, we held
that the prosecution's "efforts compl[ied] with the hearsay
exception unavailability requirements." Id. On the other hand, in
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to locate a witness
were unreasonable and the witness was not unavailable "where
efforts to secure the witness's attendance [were] cursory, where
the party had clear indications that the witness would not attend
or where the party had obvious means of obtaining those
indications but neglected to do so." Id. at 1122. See also id. at
1124-25 (affirming the district court, nonetheless, because the
district court's improper admission of the testimony was
harmless error).
The instant case is much more like the events in Drawn
than those discussed in Chapman. As in Drawn, but unlike in
Chapman, the prosecution in this case went to considerable effort
to obtain Witness's testimony at trial. Prior to the preliminary
hearing, the prosecution sent out police bike patrols to locate
Victim and Witness, and the officers located both men, even
though they were part of Salt Lake City's large homeless
population, based mostly on Victim's unfortunate lack of one
earlobe. There was nothing as distinctive in Witness's
appearance, but luckily for the prosecution, Witness was often in
<Jr12
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the company of Victim. The two were homeless, presenting
obvious challenges to staying in touch, but when Victim and
Witness arrived together at the preliminary hearing with the
pastor, whom both men trusted, the prosecution seized upon the
opportunity to use the pastor as a vehicle for staying in more
regular contact with both men. The prosecution followed up
regularly with the pastor and emailed him Defendant's trial
information. And the pastor verified that the two men
personally received this notification.
<_[13 A few weeks before trial, however, the pastor informed
the prosecution that Witness had gotten in some trouble, been
jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving this
information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Witness had
already been released. From that time forward, neither Victim
nor the pastor saw or heard from Witness, and Witness was no
longer found with his former friends or in his former haunts. It is
far from clear that he even remained in Utah. 6 Thus, although
the prosecution did not re-enlist the police bike patrols to locate
Witness, it did not need to. It had no idea where to send the

6. Research shows that not only are homeless people
more mobile than the population at large but that a
significant percentage of homeless individuals engage in
interstate migration, Peter H. Rossi, Down and Out in
America: The Origins of Homelessness 126 (The University of
Chicago Press 1989). See also Jennifer Amanda Jones,

Problems Migrate: Lessons from San Francisco's Homeless Population
Survey, Nonprofit Quarterly (June 26, 2013), available at
http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/06/26/problems-migratelessons-from-san-francisco-s-homeless-population-survey/
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-7QS2] ("Almost 40% of San Francisco's
homeless population became homeless in a city other than San
Francisco. Most (24%) hail from California, but many (15%) from
around the United States.").
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patrols, and the police would have been unlikely to recognize
Witness when not in the presence of Victim. Realistically, the
pastor and Victim were more likely to spot Witness than were
randomly dispatched bike patrols. Additionally, on the eve of
trial, the prosecution also contacted the jail to see if Witness
might once again be incarcerated. They learned he was not.
II

<j(l 4

Whether the prosecution could have done more to
ensure . . . [Witness] showed up for the trial" is not the issue;
instead, we consider whether the prosecution's efforts were
reasonable. As the State noted, "[a] good faith search does not
mean that every lead, no matter how nebulous, must be tracked
to the ends of the earth," Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th
Cir. 1974), and we conclude that the State acted reasonably even
though "[Witness] could [neither] be located nor produced in
court," Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894.
<Jl:15 Indeed, the instant case is, in our estimation, an even
stronger case for affirmance than Drawn because here Defendant
acquiesced in both the method of keeping tabs on Witness and in
the means of serving him notice of the trial. First, the prosecution
told the magistrate at the preliminary hearing that the pastor
was the best way to stay in contact with Witness. If Defendant
had an objection to this method of communication as a substitute
for more formal service, unusual though it may have been, the
time to contest it was not at trial but at the preliminary hearing
when it was first proposed. Where "there is 'apparent[] if not
complete acquiescence [in] what the court did as a matter of
procedure,' '[n]either party is in a position to complain as to
[that] procedure' on appeal." Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291,
<j( 14 n.9, 364 P.3d 60 (alterations in original) (quoting Hodges v.
Smoot, 125 P.2d 419, 421 (Utah 1942)). Second, Defendant
explicitly accepted the prosecution's proffer of its efforts to get
Witness to appear. For example, although Defendant faults the
trial court for "not even attempt[ing] to get testimony from the
pastor regarding the service to [Witness]," in doing so he ignores
the fact that the trial court offered him the opportunity to get
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such testimony from the pastor-an opportunity that he
declined. Because the prosecution made reasonable efforts to
locate Witness, though perhaps not all efforts "humanly
possible, we agree with the trial court that the prosecution
acted in good faith, and we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding Witness to be unavailable for
purposes of rule 804.
11

II. Witness's Testimony Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 804.
CJ[16 If the potential witness is unavailable, prior testimony
may be admitted if the witness gave the testimony "as a witness
at a ... hearing, Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(l)(A), and the testimony is
offered against a party who had ... an opportunity and similar
motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination,
id. R. 804(b)(l)(B). Because a preliminary hearing is a "hearing"
under rule 804(b )(1 )(A), the introduction of preliminary hearing
testimony may be allowed in lieu of the in-court testimony of the
witness if the court finds the potential witness to be unavailable.
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981). Rule 804(b)(l)(B)
essentially incorporates the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause does not allow[] admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who [does] not appear at trial unless he
[is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination
It is instructive that in
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the United States Supreme
Court concluded that if a witness is unavailable, preliminary
hearing testimony is admissible under the Confrontation Clause
because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing
11

11

11

II

11

).

closely approximat[e] those that surround the
typical trial. [The witness is put] under oath;
respondent [i]s represented by counsel . . . ;
respondent ha[s] every opportunity to crossexamine [the witness] as to his statement; and the
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proceedings [a]re conducted before a judicial
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of
the hearings.

Id. at 165. The Court determined that, under such circumstances,
a party opposing introduction of preliminary hearing testimony
"had an effective opportunity for confrontation." Id.
<J[17 Regarding the requirement that a party be given "an
opportunity" to develop the testimony of the witness, Utah R.
Evid. 804(b)(1)(B), the rule refers to the opportunity to examine
the witness, not to whether the defendant actually availed
himself of that opportunity, State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245,
4:[ 18, 314 P.3d 1014. The opportunity for cross-examination
"satisfie[s] the requirements of [the Constitution and the Rules of
Evidence]." Id. <JI 20. This principle is well-established in Utah
law, predating even the codification of the Rules of Evidence.
See, e.g., State v. King, 68 P. 418, 419 (Utah 1902) ("By taking the
testimony of the witness ... in the presence of the accused upon
the examination at a time when he had the privilege of crossexamination, this constitutional privilege is satisfied, provided
the witness cannot, with due diligence, be found . . . . The
constitutional requirement of confrontation is not violated by
dispensing with the actual presence of the witness at the trial,
after he has already been subjected to cross-examination by the
accused[.]").
<]l18 During the preliminary hearing, Defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine Witness; indeed, he admits as
much in his appellate brief. It is therefore irrelevant whether trial
counsel voluntarily elected to forgo some aspect of crossexamination due to counsel's strategy. 7 Garrido, 2013 UT App
7. Defendant makes much of the fact that the prosecution knew
procuring Witness's testimony at trial would be more difficult
than in the typical case because Witness was a homeless person.
(continued ... )

20140009-CA

11

2016 UT App 57

State v. Goins

245, <_[ 18. Indeed, forgoing or minimizing cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing is a common practice among the defense
bar. 8 But Defendant was not denied the opportunity to crossexamine Witness.
(j '

(... continued)
True enough. But like the prosecution, defense counsel knew
that Witness was homeless. Defense counsel was likewise aware
that the prosecution might have difficulty in securing the
testimony of Witness and Victim at trial. In such a context,
defense counsel could have anticipated that Witness and/or
Victim might not be physically present at trial and that, if
deemed unavailable, their testimony would be read for the jury.
In the case of homelessness and similar circumstances-such as
where a potential witness is terminally ill, seriously mentally ill,
suicidal, a known drug addict, or an active-duty soldier who
may be called up for combat deployment -there is a distinct
possibility that the witness may vanish or otherwise become
unavailable before trial. It may behoove defense cormsel in such
cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to cross-exarrrine
such witnesses. Then, if the testimony is read at trial, counsel's
cross-examination is part of what will be read, and the jury will
have a less one-sided version of the witness's testimony.
8. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent in California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), the case in which the United States Supreme
Court recognized that preliminary hearing testimony may be
admissible under the prior testimony hearsay exception, id. at
165, articulated several reasons for this common practice, id. at
197 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted,
First ... the objective of [a preliminary] hearing is
to establish the presence or absence of probable
cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a
reasonable doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to
establish probable cause, defense counsel has little
reason at the preliminary hearing to show that it
(continued ... )

20140009-CA

12

2016 UT App 57

State v. Goins

<J[19 As noted previously, however, hearsay testimony is
admissible under the prior testimony exception if, and only if,
the party offering the evidence can show that the party opposing
the introduction of the evidence had both "opportunity and
similar motive to develop it." Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(l)(B)
(emphasis added). To this end, Defendant, relying upon
persuasive authority only, attempts to convince this court that

(... continued)
does not conclusively establish guilt .... Second,
neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial
to disclose its case by extensive examination at the
preliminary hearing; thorough questioning of a
prosecution witness by defense counsel may easily
amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State.
Third, the schedules of neither court nor counsel
can easily accommodate lengthy preliminary
hearings. Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers
not concerned that the proceedings be brief, the
defense and prosecution have generally had
inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for
extensive examination. Finally, though counsel
were to engage in extensive questioning, a part of
its force would never reach the trial factfinder, who
would know the examination only second hand.

Id. See also Right of Confrontation: Substantive Use at Trial of Prior
Statements, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 108, 114 (1970) (characterizing as
"troubling" "the [Supreme] Court's use of . . . preliminary
hearing testimony" at trial, on the ground that "it had been
subject to cross-examination," because "[g]enerally, there is little
motivation for comprehensive cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing"). Whatever the truth of these sentiments,
they are not reflected in Utah law, see supra <j[ 18; therefore,
members of the defense bar might do well to heed our
suggestions in appropriate cases, see supra <J[ 18 note 7.

20140009-CA

13

2016 UT App 57

State v. Goins

when "[t]rial counsel ... initially questioned [Witness], at the
preliminary hearing, . . . she did not have [the] same motive as
she would have had at trial." Defendant further states that "[t]he
purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause,
not [to] prov[e] the cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the
cross-examination may not have been as thorough because they
are only focusing on the basis for the arrest." We are not
unsympathetic to this argument, but the Utah Supreme Court
expressly foreclosed it in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981),
which is overlooked in Defendant's briefs on appeal.
<:1(20 Dismissing as meritless arguments identical to those raised
by Defendant in this case, our Supreme Court concluded in
Brooks that "counsel's motive and interest are the same in either
[the trial or preliminary hearing] setting; he acts in both
situations in the interest of and motivated by establishing the
innocence of his client. Therefore, cross-examination takes place
at preliminary hearing and at trial under the same motive and
interest." Id. at 541. Thus, adhering to the rationale of Brooks, we
determine that Defendant's challenge is unavailing, and we
affirm the decision of the trial court to admit Witness's
preliminary hearing testimony.

CONCLUSION
<:1(21 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
Witness's preliminary hearing testimony when it found that
Witness was unavailable to testify because, under the
circumstances, the State made reasonable efforts to procure the
testimony of Witness at trial. Because Defendant had an
appropriate opportunity to cross-examine Witness, Witness's
testimony from that hearing was admissible under rule 804.
<:1(22

Affirmed.
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SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
PETER D. LEAVITT, Bar No. 11407
Deputy District Attorney
I 11 E. BROADWAY, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8411 I
Telephone: (801 )363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

Assigned to: PETER LEA VITT

AMENDED
INFORMATION

vs.

DAO# 13014430

DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS
DOB: 11/29/1990,
AKA: DESEAN GOINS, MOSELY,
DESEAN MOSELY,DESEAN
GOINSMOSLEY
746 NORTH 900 WEST APT 105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT
D.L.#
OTN 43077601
SO# 367909
Defendant.

Case No. 131906358

The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written declaration states on
information and belief that the defendant, DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, committed the crime(s)
of:
COUNT 1
MAYHEM, 76-5-105 UCA, Second Degree Felony, as follows: That on or about July 05, 2013
at 350 South 400 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did unlawfully and
intentionally deprive a human being of a member of his or her body, or disable or render it
useless, or cut out or disable the tongue, or put out an eye, or slit the nose, ear, or lip.
COUNT2
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 76-5-103(1) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or
about July 05, 2013 at 350 South 400 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did
commit assault as defined in Utah Code Section 76-5-102 and used
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STATE vs DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS
DAO# 13014430
Page2
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601; or

(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
COUNT3
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 76-5-103(1) UCA, Third Degree Felony, as follows: That on or
about July OS, 2013 at 350 South 400 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did
commit assault as defined in Utah Code Section 76-5-102 and used
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
J BRIERLEY, J BRIERLEY, RICHARD BRYSON, MICHAEL CARDWELL,

GABRIEL ESTRADA, CHRIS HOLDING, JUSTIN HUSDON, HOKU LIi LIi MANUELDIZON, DONALD MEYERS, JACOB OMAR, ROBERT SHORT, JARED ZARGOZA,
DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
This Information is based upon the following:
The statement of Officer Cardwell of the Salt Lake City Police Department that on July 5,
2013, he responded to the Pioneer Park located at 350 West 400 South in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on a report of a fight in progress. Upon arrival, Officer Cardwell was flagged down by
Donald Meyers who stated that he saw a male hitting another male in a green shirt. Mr. Meyers
stated that he saw the first male stab the male in the green shirt with a knife. Mr. Meyers stated
that the argument was over a cell phone.
@

Officer Cardwell located Jacob Omar in Pioneer Park and found that he had a stab wound
and part of his ear missing. Mr. Omar stated that a male approached him and they got into an
argument. Mr. Omar stated that the male accused him of stealing his phone and grabbed a knife
and stabbed him. Officer Cardwell located Mr. Omar's earlobe on the ground where the incident
occurred. Mr. Omar was transported to the hospital for treatment.
Officer Mortensen located defendant DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS walking away from
the park at 180 West 400 South in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant GOINS had some
small cuts on his face and admitted that he had a knife in his bag. Officer Mortensen removed a
black handled kitchen knife from defendant GOINS bag. The defendant admitted post-Miranda
to Officer Mortensen that he had been in an altercation with Mr. Omar and that he bit Mr.
Omar's ear and grabbed his knife and stabbed him with it.

--
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STATE vs DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS
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Sgt. Hudson responded to the area to assist and a male identified as Gabriel Estrada
began yelling at the defendant. Sgt. Hudson approached Mr. Estrada who stated that he saw that
Mr. Omar had been stabbed and knew that defendant GOINS had stabbed him. Mr. Estrada
stated that the defendant approached him prior to the incident with Mr. Omar and threatened to
stab him with a knife while accusing him of stealing his phone. Mr. Estrada stated that he feared
for his safety and left the area. Mr. Estrada described the knife which matched the knife found in
the defendant's bag.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.
Executed on:

----------

J BRIERLEY
Declarant
Authorized for presentment and filing
SIM GILL, District Attorney

@

Deputy · ct Attorney
18th da of July, 2013
MAH /DAO# 13014430
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Utah R. Evid. Rule 804
Copy Citation
Current with rules received through September 1, 2016.
Utah Court Rules

STATE RULES

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

ARTICLE VIII.

HEARSAY

Rule 804. Exceptions to the rule against hearsay -- When the
declarant is unavailable as a witness
{a) Criteria for being unavailable. -- A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a
witness if the declarant:
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's

statement because the court rules that a privilege applies;

(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so;

(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter;
(4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a
then-existing infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or

(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been
able, by process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance.
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or
wrongfully caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the
declarant from attending or testifying.
(b) The exceptions. -- The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the

declarant is unavailable as a witness:
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(1) Former testimony. -- Testimony that:

(A} was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given
during the current proceeding or a different one; and

(B} is now offered against a party who had -- or, in a civil case, whose
predecessor in interest had -- an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by
direct, cross-, or redirect examination.

(2) Statement under the belief of imminent death. -- In a civil or criminal case, a
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant1s death to be
imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement against interest. -- A statement that:

(A} a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the

person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the
declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to
invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant
to civil or criminal liability; and

(B} is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the
declarant to criminal liability.

( 4} Statement of personal or family history. -- A statement about:
(A} the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce,
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history,
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that
fact; or
(B} another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the

declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so
intimately associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is
likely to be accurate.

History
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Copy Citation
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Utah Court Rules

STATE RULES

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 14. Subpoenas
(a) Subpoenas requiring the attendance of a witness or interpreter and production or
inspection of records, papers, or other objects.
(1) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before a court,

magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution
may be issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, the prosecuting
attorney on his or her own initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or the
court in which an information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court in
which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, without charge, as
many signed subpoenas as the defendant may require. An attorney admitted to
practice in the court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign a
subpoena as an officer of the court.

(2) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to appear and
testify or to produce in court or to allow inspection of records, papers or other
objects, other than those records pertaining to a victim covered by Subsection (b).
The court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable.

(3) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years who is not a
party. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or
interpreter personally and notifying the witness or interpreter of the contents. A peace
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officer shall serve any subpoena delivered for service in the peace officer's county.

(4) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court and
to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating the time and place of
service and by whom service was made.

(5) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness from anywhere in the state.

(6) When a person required as a witness is in custody within the state, the court
may order the officer having custody of the witness to bring the witness before the
court.

(7) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a
contempt of the court responsible for its issuance.

(8) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as
to afford reasonable grounds for believing that the witness will be unable to attend a
trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the court for an
order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance of the
witness at the deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be
present at the deposition and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to
effect such attendance.

(b) Subpoenas for the production of records of victim.
(1) No subpoena or court order compelling the production of medical, mental health,

school, or other non-public records pertaining to a victim shall be issued by or at the
request of the defendant unless the court finds after a hearing, upon notice as
provided below, that the defendant is entitled to production of the records sought
under applicable state and federal law.

(2) The request for the subpoena or court order shall identify the records sought
with particularity and be reasonably limited as to subject matter.
(3) The request for the subpoena or court order shall be filed with the court as soon

as practicable, but no later than 28 days before trial, or by such other time as
permitted by the court. The request and notice of any hearing shall be served on
counsel for the victim or victim's representative and on the prosecutor. Service on an
unrepresented victim shall be made on the prosecutor.

(4) If the court makes the required findings under subsection (b)(l), it shall issue a
subpoena or order requiring the production of the records to the court. The court shall
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then conduct an in camera review of the records and disclose to the defense and
prosecution only those portions that the defendant has demonstrated a right to
inspect.

(5) The court may, in its discretion or upon motion of either party or the victim or
1

the victim s representative, issue any reasonable order to protect the privacy of the
victim or to limit dissemination of disclosed records.
(6) For purposes of this rule, "victim'' and 11 victim 1 s representative 11 are used as

defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(2).

( c) Applicability of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The provisions of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the content,
issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are consistent with
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History

Amended effective November 1, 1996; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2007; November 1, 2015
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Constitution of Utah

Article I Declaration of Rights

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
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Constitution of Utah

Article I Declaration of Rights

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

History

Const. 1896.
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Utah R. App. P. Rule 35
Copy Citation
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Utah Court Rules
PROCEDURE

STATE RULES

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 35. Petition for rehearing
(a) Petition for rehearing permitted. -- A rehearing will not be granted in the absence of
a petition for rehearing. A petition for rehearing may be filed only in cases in which the
court has issued an opinion, memorandum decision, or per curiam decision. No other
petitions for rehearing will be considered.

(b) Time for filing. -- A petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days
after issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, or per curiam decision of the court,
unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order.

(c) Contents of petition. -- A petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14
days after issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, or per curiam decision of the
court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition shall state with
particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked
or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the
petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.

(d) Oral argument. -- Oral argument in support of the petition will not be permitted.
(e) Response. -- No response to a petition for rehearing will be received unless
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requested by the court. Any response shall be filed within 14 days after the entry of the
order requesting the response, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A petition for
rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a request for a response.

(f) Form of petition. -- The petition shall be in a form prescribed by Rule 27 and shall
include a copy of the decision to which it is directed.

(g) Number of copies to be filed and served. -- An original and 6 copies shall be filed
with the court. Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party separately
represented.

(h) Length. -- Except by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any response
requested by the court shall not exceed 15 pages.
(i) Color of cover. -- The cover of a petition for rehearing shall be tan; that of any
response to a petition for rehearing filed by a party, white; and that of any response filed
by an amicus curiae, green. All brief covers shall be of heavy cover stock. There shall be
adequate contrast between the printing and the color of the cover.
(j) Action by court if granted. -- If a petition for rehearing is granted, the court may

make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may restore it to the
calendar for reargument or resubmission, or may make such other orders as are deemed
appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.
(k) Untimely or consecutive petitions. -- Petitions for rehearing that are not timely

presented under this rule and consecutive. petitions for rehearing will not be received by
the clerk.
(I) Amicus curiae. -- An amicus curiae may not file a petition for rehearing but may file a

response to a petition if the court has requested a response under subparagraph (e) of
this rule.

History

Amended effective October 1, 1992; April 1, 2004; June 1, 2010; November 1, 2014
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF PTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Case No: 131906358 FS
Judge :
ANN BOYDEN .
Date:
December 9, 2013

PRESENT
Clerk:
patd
Prosecutor: BLAYLOCK, ROGER s
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SINGLETON, LACEY C
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 29, 1990
Sheriff Office#: 367909
Audio
Tape Number:
S42
Tape Count: 917-936
CHARGES
·2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/2013 Guilty
3. THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
·
Pleai Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/20·13 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is ~uspended.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE

DESEAN GOlNSMOSELY
DESEAN MOSELY

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS
WEAPON IN FIGHT a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced
to a term of 180 day(s) in the Salt Lake County Jail.
Commitment is to begin immediately.
Credit is granted for time served.
Printed: 12/09/13 09:35:18
Page 1
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Case No: 131906358 Date:

Dec 09, 2013

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE

@

Credit for Time Served from 7-5-13
Attorney·Fees ·
Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER
@

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.

PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary .conditions required by Adult Probation and
Parole.
If supervised by Adult Probation and Parole: all fines, fees and/or
restitution are to be paid directly to Adult Probation and.Parole.
Violate no laws.
·
No contact with victim(s).
Undergo asse·ssment to determine appropriate counseling. Enter and
successfully complete any recommended treatment.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling or
treatment as directed by probation agency.
Comply with all ~tandard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by
probation agency.
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor
associate-with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol
or illega1 drugs.
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise
distributed illegally . .
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the
request of any law enforcement officer and/or probation agent.
No spice, ivory wave or items of that nature.
Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing.
Submit to s·earch of person and/or property upon the request of any
law enforcement officer.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Not to po$sess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the
chief item of sale.
Obtain a mental health evaluation and successfully complete any
recommended treatment.
Defendant to take medications as prescribed.
Complete T.R.C as Directed by AP&P
Evaluations to be Completed Within 60 Days of Release
No Contact With Witnesses

Printed: 12/09/13 09:35:18
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Case No: 131906358 Date:

Dec 09, 2013

State Has 120 Days to Provide
Date:
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MINUTES

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS,
Defendant.
custody: Salt Lake county Jail

~

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
:

case No: 131906358 FS
Judge:
ANN BOYDEN
Date:
July 14, 2014

PRESENT
Clerk:
mandya
Prosecutor: DEESING, ANDREW K
Defendant
Defendant•s Attorney(s): SINGLETON, LACEY C
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of.birth: November 29, 1990
Sheriff Office#: 367909
Audio
Tape Number:
S-42
Tape Count: 10:50-11:00
CHARGES

2 .,

3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/2013 Guilty
3. THREAT/USE OF DANGEROUS WEAPON IN FIGHT (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/25/2013 Guilty
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT -

HEARING

TIME: 10:50 AM This case comes before the court on an Order to
Show Cause hearing .
SENTENCE PRISON

Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Printed: -07/14/14 15:04:19
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case No: 131906358 Date:

Jul 14, 2014

ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
DESEAN GOINSMOSELY
DESEAN MOSELY

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE

Defendant served a sentence of 180 days for count 2 at the time of
original sentence.
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT

The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated
in the Affidavit and Order to Show cause: 3, 4, 5

The following numbered allegations are dismissed as stated in the
affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9
The defendant's probation is revoked.
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
Based upon the admissions to allegations 3, 4, S the remaining
allegations are dismissed ~ithout prejudice on the state's motion.
court strikes financial requirements with the exception of
restitution owed.

@

ORIGINAL SENTENCE OF PRISON

Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.

@

ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE

DBSEAN GOINSMOSBLY
DESEAN

MOSELY

CUSTODY
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Case No: 131906358 Date:

Jul 14, 2014

The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt

Date:% {lf.t,ll~
jail. [
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

: Case No. 131906358FS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: Appellate Court Case No. ?.llli.2 n,~-~H'\T t"Q•
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1

begin with picking the jury tomorrow morning because we will

2

have been able to address all preliminary matters today,

3

okay?
What is the preliminary motion that you wish to

4
5

address at this time?
MR. LEAVITT:

6

.•-.....

Your Honor, the preliminary motion is

7

this, Gabriel Estrada who is the listed victim in Count 3, we

8

have gone to some lengths to try to procure his attendance

9

here today -

10

THE COURT: Proffer those efforts for me, please.

11

MR. LEAVITT: And what those - as an offer of proof,

12

Your Honor, what those efforts were was about a month ago -

13

in order to procure his attendance at the preliminary

14

hearing, both of these witnesses in this case are homeless.

15

Their address is a shelter and so as the Court knows, there's

16

a very transient nature to that and it's sometimes hard to

17

locate people.

18

hearing what we did is we contacted the Salt Lake City Bike

19

Police and were able to find them mostly based on Jacob

20

Omar's appearance because as a result of this case he has a

21

missing earlobe.

22

that Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar both came to the preliminary

23

hearing.

24

referred as their pastor whose name was Russ.

25

the K-2 Church and he's in charge - he was at the time in

In order to do that for the preliminary

They were able to do that and when they did

When they did so they brought a person they
He's part of

3

.---..

-·-.

1

charge of community outreach, so a lot of his, a lot of his

2

job and a lot of his responsibilities dealt with, you know,

3

getting to know the people in the area, watching out for

4

the~, helping them out, helping them through the process.

5

Russ was the person who was the contact 'cause, of course,

6

these two homeless people don't have cell phones or any way

7

that I can contact them regularly.

8

the prelim and I had spoke with Russ and spoke with them at

9

the prelim and asked them if it's okay if I go through Russ

Russ had brought them to

10

to contact them and let them know when we get a trial date

11

and they agreed to that, both Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar did

12

that.

13

subpoena.

14

about a month ago.

15

opportunity to serve both Mr. Omar and Mr. Estrada those

16

subpoenas letting them know the court date and letting them

17

know that they needed to be here.

18

I maintained some contact with Russ just to make sure that he

19

tabs on them as the trial was getting closer.

20

job for another job and his replacement, Jason, whose here

21

today with Mr. Omar, they're in the conference room.

22

kind of taking over for Russ and was aware of the situation,

23

was able to verify that indeed Russ did serve the subpoena on

24

Gabriel Estrada.

25

weeks Mr. Estrada has come into some trouble.

I kept in contact with Russ and I had emailed him a
Russ informed me - and I emailed that subpoena
Russ informed that he did have the

Now, he since that time

Russ left that

He was

They both informed me that in the last few
He was in jail
4

--.

1

at one point.

2

now, he was actually released on September 24th.

3

it again about a week ago and I checked yesterday to see if

4

he'd been returned to jail, he's not.

5

this point.

6

..-........

,

We checked

So he's not in jail at

Mr. Omar and the community pastor have let me know

I guess Mr. Omar and Mr.

7

that they've lost touch with him.

8

Estrada have kind of had a falling out and so they were

9

concerned that he may not be here today.

He did have a

10

subpoena, he did know about the court date but - and again,

11

Jason, the new community outreach person, I had him watching

12

for Gabriel the last couple of days to see if he saw him to

13

make contact with him.

14

around in that area any_more and he's kind of involved with a

15

different crowd, but again, his whereabouts are unknown.

16

He did not.

He said he doesn't run

Our position, Your Honor, is that we have - he's

17

been served by process and we've gone to additional means to

18

try to find this witness, he's unavailable and so again, this

19

is going to take a two-part test.

20

unavailability now and so the Court asked for a proffer of

21

what we've done, that's what we've done to try to procure his

22

attendance, he's not here today.

23

24

.----

I checked the jail yesterday, he's not there

25

THE COURT:

All right.

So I'm just addressing

Do you want to address

different steps or do you want - that's fine.
MR. LEAVITT:

And we can address unavailability and
5

1

.. ~...

~.--·--..

then if we get to there I think we can address the rule.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. VENABLE:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. VENABLE:

All right, thank you.
Your Honor, I'll address Mr. Venable then.
In the United States Supreme Court

6

and the Utah Courts have held that the right to confront

7

witnesses at trial and to provide the fact finder an

8

opportunity to access their credibi~ity, cannot be lightly

9

dismissed.

I know the Court of Appeals in State v. Tron said

10

that for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it

11

must practically impossible to produce the witness in court

12

and, you know, in this case, in State v. Tron, they found

13

that the witness was unavailable but that was because the

14

D.A. subpoenaed that witness three times, they had their

15

detective on the case search for him, go to the last known

16

addresses. They had the detective, you know, calling family

17

members. Detective search consisted of questioning police

18

informants, searching police files and working with Salt Lake

19

County investigators to try and procure the attendance of

20

that witness.

21

even served by, you know, a member of the police or the

22

attorney's office, it was emailed to a pastor and then passed

23

along.

24

unavailability.

25

You know, in this case the subpoena wasn't

That's just simply not enough to meet the prong of

THE COURT:

Thank you.
6

.-----.

1

Any further response on that?

2

MR. LEAVITT:

3

as far as different cases that have addressed the issue, in

4

Brown vs. Heathman, the 1987 case in Utah, in that one they

5

didn't even try to serve the person because they didn't they

6

were here because they didn't know where they were and so

7

they didn't even serve them and the Court in that case - and

8

I have copies for counsel [inaudible].
In that case, Your Honor, you can simply look at

9

..................

10

page, Page 3 it just says at the very bottom of that

11

Paragraph 2 at the very bottom,

12

an inability of attendance of a witness the opponent must -

13

of prior testimony must always attempt service of process.

14

But then it talks about other reasonable means and does not

15

require (inaudible) attempt to serve a subpoena on a witness.

16

We served a subpoena on the witness here.

17

than this.

(inaudible) in order to show

We've gone further

As far as the notion that when we start arguing

18

.-•-~-

Our response, Your Honor, is simply

19

ability to cross examine and confront a witness, again, we'll

20

get to that when we get to the prior testimony but the issue

21

that that raises is whether or not Mr. Goins has had the

22

opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness.

23

we are asking the Court to offer is prior preliminary hearing

24

testimony.

25

opportunity to cross examine Mr. Estrada about this.

What

Ms. Singleton who is his attorney now had the
They
7

1

had an opportunity to confront him about everything that's

2

going to be coming in.

3

examination.

4

Court didn't stop the cross examination, the Court didn't

5

limit the cross examination.

6

examine him and ferret out any truth or bias or anything that

7

they wanted to do and that's what he's entitled to

8

constitutionally.

9

hearing, it's a complete transcript.

10

----

...

There was a complete cross

There were not even any objections made and the

Defense was able to cross

He was given that right at the preliminary
That's what we're

asking to offer.

11

Under - I suppose now is probably as good a time as

12

any to talk about where we're offering the exception which is

13

804(b) (1) which is former testimony and indeed it is

14

testimony that was given at a hearing and is now offered

15

against the party who had an opportunity and similar motive

16

to develop and cross and redirect examination which they were

17

able to do.

18

As far as his right to confront a witness, he's had

19

that right with this testimony.

20

statement, we're not offering an out-of-court statement. It

21

was a statement that was made in court, at a prior proceeding

22

in this case under oath in which Mr. Goins had ample

23

opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness.

24

25

We're not offering an 1102

Again, are there more things that we could do?
Sure, we could send out, we could send out an army of people
8

--...__

,--.........

1

to try to find that person but that's not what we're required

2

to do under the rule.

3

persuaded that we have acted in good faith, with reasonable

4

diligence to try to locate a witness and we've been unable to

5

do so.

6

with, with this homeless man, I maintained that contact. He

7

served him a subpoena.

8

he's not here.

9

that they're absent from the trial and we've not been able to

The requirement is that the Court is

We have done that.

The one person who I had contact

Mr. Estrada has that subpoena and

The rule says that if the person is served,

10

get them by process, that's what that subpoena is.

11

served in process.

12

reasonable·means.

13

other reasonable means to locate people who know him and try

14

to find him but we've been unable to do that.

15

matter because he was served a subpoena.

16

and we've done what we can to get him here.

17

confrontation right has been fulfilled, we're offering

18

preliminary hearing testimony and nothing else.

That's it.

We don't even get to

We've gone above that and tried to go to

19

THE COURT:

20

confrontation issue?

But it doesn't

He's not here today
Again, the

Do you want to address the

MS. SINGLETON:

21

He was

Yes, Your Honor I can address that

22

issue.

Your Honor, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that

23

the (inaudible) confrontation law does not apply to

24

preliminary hearings and although, under the rules for the

25

admission of former testimony, you know, as far as having had
9

.--..

@ ..-.....
_

~

1

an opportunity, a prior opportunity to cross examine the

2

witness which, yes, there was a preliminary hearing in this

3

case and yes, we did have the opportunity to cross examine

4

Mr. Estrada, I would submit that that is - that would still

5

violate my client's right to confront and cross examine the

6

witnesses against him by admitting this testimony at trial.

7

The reason being that under 804(b) (1) (b) it specifically

8

states that you had an opportunity and similar motive to

9

develop it by direct, cross, or redirect examination and in

10

these preliminary hearings there is an abbreviated procedure

11

and quite frankly, Your Honor, the motive in developing

12

testimony is different at a preliminary hearing than it is at

13

trial.

14

hearings that we would not ask at trial because evidence is

15

admissible at trial - or at a preliminary hearing but not

16

necessarily is admissible in a trial.

17

are different and - or, or by the same token, we don't ask

18

question that we might ask at a trial because credibility

19

determinations are not being made a preliminary hearing.

20

Court making the probable cause determination is not

21

assessing the credibility of a witness, therefore we do not

22

ask those questions to get that information out.

23

believe that the motive of developing that testimony is the

24

same at a preliminary hearing as it would be at trial and

25

therefore it would violate my client's right to confront and

We frequently ask questions during preliminary

The rules of evidence

The

So I don't

10

---.

....-........

_

1

cross examine the witnesses against him by admitting this

2

testimony, the preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LEAVITT:

Thank you.
May I just briefly address the Sixth

5

Amendment issue?

The fact the Supreme Court said that that

6

Sixth Amendment right to confrontation would not apply to

7

prelim, that's being used in reverse here.

8

saying is that you don't get every single witness at a

9

preliminary hearing.

What they're

You don't get to have that right to

10

confront them.

Now, when they're there and you've confronted

11

them, that right to confrontation has been fulfilled.

12

what that case is saying is it's saying that reliable hearsay

13

can be admitted at a preliminary hearing and you can't insist

14

on every single witness being at a preliminary hearing, not

15

the reverse.

16

right may be fulfilled at the preliminary hearing, it's just

17

that they can't necessarily assert that right at a

18

preliminary hearing, and again, as we know, as a matter

19

(inaudible} every - in this instance had I objected to say,

20

Hey, these are questions about credibility, this is beyond

21

the scope of this hearing and Ms. Singleton had been shut

22

down, I can see how possibly they didn't get a complete cross

23

examination.

24

cross examination at every single prelim, we talk about

25

inferences, statements, we talk about bias, we talk about all

But

It's not that you don't have that right, that

But as we know, as a matter of course, every

11

.---...

·--

..

1

of these things that she's saying they don't have a motive to

2

do but that's what the cross examination at preliminary

3

hearing is about.

4

witness, it's been fulfilled and so the testimony should be

5

admitted.

6

THE COURT:

7

I'm going to address first of all the initial prong
of whether or not this witness is actually unavailable and

9

the parties have been willing to do as I ask, to just go on

10

proffer of what the State has done.

11

to accept those proffers with out contesting the proffers of

12

what they've done to serve him without bringing in the -

13

without hearing from Jason I guess is who the witness we have

14

here.

15

availability issue goes?

16

MS. SINGLETON:

18

Are both parties willing

Are you willing to accept those proffers as far as the

I'll accept the proffer, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right and I do find that based on

19

the proffer of what the State has done to procure this

20

witness's testimony, that he is unavailable under Rule 804 as

21

far as that first prong goes.

22

.----.....__

All right, thank you.

8

17

@

They had an opportunity to confront that

The key for that for me is that he knew about when

23

this hearing was, I mean, whether the service is actually

24

done by law enforcement officer or a pastor or a friend or a

25

neighbor or a spouse or someone's whose at the home when it's

12

----•..

·--,

1

delivered by mail, the key is is I cannot find fairly that

2

someone is unavailable if they really do not know when this

3

trial is.

4

he was in jail and released from jail on September 24th was

5

aware of this court date and had, in fact, come to a

6

preliminary hearing, so knew the proceeding was going.

7

finding that for the requirements of Rule 804 - and we are

8

dealing specifically with subsection A, sub-5 in this case,

9

that the State did do reasonable means of process and, in

----

....\

I am

10

fact, due process has actually occurred as far as trying to

11

get Mr. Estrada here and he is not here.

12

appeared.

13

we're an hour past the time when he would have been

14

subpoenaed to have come in and meet with them and he is not

15

present.

16

..

All indications are that this person, even before

He has not

This is the time set for this hearing, in fact

As we go to the next prong and that is the next

17

part of this analysis, argument has been made that the right

18

to confrontation is met if the defendant, defense counsel or

19

opposing counsel of the witness has had an opportunity to

20

cross examine under circumstances that would provide a

21

similar motive.

22

type of a cross examination and opportunity that it meets the

23

criteria needed for Rule 804?

24

preliminary hearing. Has that been given to me and I just

25

don't, haven't received it electronically?

That is what's key here, was it the same

I have not read the

13
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1

weren't able to do if they were in trial and sometimes that

2

changes the circumstances.

3

the jury pool gathering right now. Have you received a list

4

of how many?

...

---

5

CLERK:

6

THE COURT:

And I know that we didn't need as many

as we had originally scheduled in for yesterday.

8

called in more than usual because of the number one setting

9

on yesterday's calendar was a domestic violence case and that

10

sometimes takes more.

11

clarify.

12

the record.

13

to different timings?

14

evidence?

16
17

....

We called in 46 and there are 8 no-shows.

7

15

--

So my understanding is we do have

I had

That's a lot put on the record just to

I know that each of the parties want the benefit of
Where are we now as far as requests for looking
How we're going to proceed with the

It was your request, Ms. Singleton, that started,
what is the defense's position right now.
MS. SINGLETON:

Your Honor, I believe - well - and

18

again not knowing when you referenced how long the next date

19

would be and we have discussed with Mr. Goins what our

20

position is and I think he understands why we are requesting

21

a continuance. Our main issues, Your Honor, are - well, there

22

are two, I guess, one being that again this was scheduled for

23

a 2-day trial.

24

and today and she is still scheduled to work tomorrow and so

25

our concern is that if this were to run into a second day for

We had subpoenaed our witness for yesterday

2

__......_......

1

whatever reason that we would be precluded from having our

2

witness available.

3

.--.....

---

..

And secondly, upon further sort of consideration of

4

the issue of the testimony that will be admitted from the

5

preliminary hearing, there are things that we would need to

6

address with that in terms of the evidentiary admissibility

7

of some of that testimony.

8

that we objected to were based on grounds of the

9

confrontation clause and 804.

And I think our issue yesterday

Today our issue would be with

10

respect to some evidentiary concerns with things that were

11

said in that preliminary hearing that would not otherwise be

12

admissible at trial.

13

today, we are renewing our objection - well, I gues~ I should

14

- I guess this is going to be relevant if we, depending on

15

what the Court rules about a continuance but just to, just so

16

it's out there, we are renewing our objection to the

17

unavailability ruling because today is a different day, this

18

is the 24th.

19

based in part on the fact that Mr. Estrada was presumably

20

aware of yesterday's court date and not here.

21

different day.

22

effort to locate him yesterday. They could have sent officers

23

out to locate him. They could have called jails, hospitals,

24

things of that nature.

25

Estrada needs to be readdressed today.

And, Your Honor, for the record, again

I believe the Court's ruling yesterday was

Today is a

I believe the State could have made overnight

I think the unavailability of Mr.

We still maintain our
3

.--._

1

objection in any event to that testimony coming in at all but

2

again, that's an issue to be discussed if we are going

3

forward today.

4
5

·---.

THE COURT:

And the objection is still the

unavailability, you're not arguing any of the other?

6

MS. SINGLETON:

7

was yesterday along on -

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. SINGLETON:

I think my objection stands as it

Okay.
- all grounds but I'm renewing the

10

unavailable objections stating it is a different day but I do

11

think that that's going to depend on whether we're going

12

forward today or not but (inaudible).

13

Your Honor.

14

.-.._

But -

THE COURT:

That's our position,

Tell me a little bit about defense

15

witness that is the problem.

Who is it and is the work

16

situation such that - that was one of the things, wasn't it?

17

That was the first request for a delay that certainly with

18

the timing in the same respect that I would anticipate the

19

State would be able to make some efforts to get their

20

witnesses and that changes the unavailability and I even

21

responded to that in one of the emails with the Court but

22

what about this witness.

23

today and tomorrow.

24

testimony is going to be coming - excuse me, for yesterday

25

and today - thank you very much, Wednesday and Thursday and I

I mean, she was subpoenaed for

It's still anticipated that much of the

4

-·-----

.--.

.---._

1

do need to make sure that we're clear on that, for the first

2

two days of trial, of a 2-day scheduled trial, Wednesday and

3

Thursday and then when we recognized yesterday that we were

4

not going to have Wednesday as the first day, talked about

5

putting on the evidence on Thursday and then hopefully being

6

able to reserve Friday for arguments and deliberations but

7

the defense did anticipate all along that it would be a 2-day

8

trial and so you were anticipating the best you can with the

9

presentation of evidence that the defense witnesses would be

10

going on day two.

11

here so she can give me some information that way - to make

12

arrangements and see if she could be available for Friday?

13

First of all, just a proffer, I know that the defense doesn't

14

have any obligation to put on a defense, defense witnesses,

15

but what is anticipated that her -

16

MS. SINGLETON:

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. SINGLETON:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. SINGLETON:

21

THE COURT:

Has she had an opportunity - and she is

As far as her testimony?

Yeah.
She was present during the -

Okay, so she - all of this -

- was anticipated all along.

This is

22

not rebuttal type of, to the extent that the defense is.

23

Okay then, what is the work situation - and the name of the

24

witness?

25

MS. SINGLETON:

This is Ms. Star.
5

......___"';.

THE COURT:

1
2

that you have?
MS. STAR:

3
4

THE COURT:

6

MS. STAR:

_..-..-._......

THE COURT:

.. ~......

But that's about it.

I get off early to

Okay. And when do you typically get

off?

10

MS. STAR:

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. STAR:

13

THE COURT:

14

Okay.

walk to work because I don't have my boss to pick me up.

8

9

I work Friday mornings and I don't know

when I get off early in the morning.

5

7

Okay, and what is the work situation

Maybe about 7:30, sometimes 8:00.
In the morning?
Yes.
And that would be the case tomorrow

morning as well?

15

MS. STAR: That was -

16

THE COURT: So that would not be a conflict then ..

17

There's no way that we're going to be starting before 7:30 in

18

the morning.

19

defense witness is the only concern about going forward

20

today?

21

next one as far as that you w~nt to have an opportunity to go

22

through and redact testimony?

So am I correct in understanding then that the

And that you want to deal with that and we - with the

23

MS. SINGLETON:

24

THE COURT:

25

Yes.

Has that been done?

I mean, we've had

an extra day, where are we with how - first of all let's put
6

1

on the record where we are and I'll let the State respond on

2

that and it's going to be a back and forth response.

3

ruling yesterday - and the defense has accurately reflected

4

that I ruled under the circumstances that the ·witness was

5

unavailable yesterday and even with that ruling it does not

6

change the responsibility of the proponent of that testimony

7

to go forward with that testimony and we did run into some

8

logistical problems with the presentation of that testimony.

·--

9

testimony that I ruled yesterday, the preliminary hearing

11

testimony of Witness Delgado that I ruled was appropriate?

13

14

.---.

How does the State anticipate putting on the

10

12
..-....._

My

MR. LEAVITT:

The same way I think that we had left

it yesterday and that is to play the actual audio.
THE COURT:

Okay.

And again, it is the Court, the

15

clerk that has been putting that together but with the two

16

problems that had been raised with that testimony is the

17

written testimony neither party was satisfied accurately

18

represented it.

19

and has there been any effort to get some type of a redacted,

20

written copy so that there aren't objections and that there

21

aren't otherwise inadmissible portions of that testimony?

22

The fact that I.ruled under the rule that he was unavailable

23

does mean that otherwise inadmissible evidence wouldn't be

24

able to come in through that way.

25

There has not been an official transcript

Has there been any -

MS. SINGLETON: Well, Your Honor, I guess - well, we
7

1

gave the State our copy of the recording.

---,

THE COURT: And that's all we've been - really the

2
3

State is the proponent of the testimony but the only written

4

copy that we've had was the defendant's unofficial copy of

5

it.

6

··---.

.-·--

MS. SINGLETON:

That's correct, Your Honor, but my

7

understanding was that the State wasn't satisfied with that

8

so no, to answer your question, no, we have gone through to

9

redact things and again, that was part of the basis for the

10

continuance yesterday was that I thought upon further

11

consideration that it would be more appropriate to get a

12

certified transcript that is not, you know, one-sided, you

13

know, our evidence that can be gone through.

14

THE COURT:

And with that you just used that as a

15

basis for a motion to continue.

16

attempt to come to an agreement of some kind of a copy

17

redacted or otherwise that you have-

But there has not been any

18

MR. LEAVITT:

No.

19

THE COURT:

- on that one?

20

All right.

And the second reason and the most

21

important reason why I put this all on the record this

22

morning - and that's what we're doing is that when I received

23

information that the email had been sent to the Court that

24

the defense was looking for a continuance because of those

25

two reasons, within moments there was an objection from the
8

1

State.

Was that inaccurate or is there an objection from the

2

State to that continuance -

.-.,

3

MR. LEAVITT: Yes, there is.

4

THE COURT: - and that's why there needed to be a

5

hearing with the defendant present and that's why there

6

weren't - it wasn't handled on a phone call [inaudible], it

7

just wasn't appropriate.

8

to continue, then we need to address it.

9

I am concerned about and in-custody defendant and

10

now there is not the consideration of the witness that is a

11

problem so the remaining basis for the request to continue

12

this trial is because of the way we're going to be presenting

13

the preliminary hearing testimony of Witness Delgado that I

14

ruled was appropriate yesterday.

15

And again, the availability goes to that.

When

16

there was a request for a continuance, certainly the State

17

would need to continue to make efforts to have that witness

18

available and that's one problem with granting a continuance

19

as well is that then it starts all over again and the State

20

needs to make the efforts to do it.

21

.-..._

If there's an objection to a motion

I would also have anticipated that with the

22

additional day that there would have been some efforts to

23

find that witness this morning.

24

to try and reach him?

25

MR. LEAVITT:

Has anything been attempted

Your Honor, what we were doing
9

·-

1

yesterday, we already knew the trial was going to continue to

2

today and we (inaudible) your ruling and we based our actions

3

yesterday on that ruling.

4

unavailability, nothing has changed.

5

subpoena.

As far as his continued
He received a 2-day

He was subpoenaed to be here today as well -

6

THE COURT: And he knew that he had both days.

7

MR. LEAVITT: - and is not here.

But what we did

8

yesterday and we didn't address availability before we knew

9

our trial yesterday was going to continue.

We addressed it

10

afterwards.

11

circumstances we thought the Court was making a ruling on

12

what was going to happen today because we knew the trial

13

wasn't going yesterday.

Based on the Court's - based on those

..

THE COURT:

14

Okay, and I agree except to the extent

15

that the issue is how are we going to present it?

16

happened yesterday MR. LEAVITT:

17
18
19

What

That's what - and I can respond to

that.
THE COURT:

That's what we need to address.

The

20

State needs - the State in this case - because you're the

21

proponent of the testimony to come in through the preliminary

22

- is the one that then needs to have some way in which it can

23

be presented.

24
25

MR. LEAVITT:

And I can address that now.

I was

answering your question as far as unavailability first and

10

1

now I'll address as far as the presentation of the evidence,

2

Your Honor.

3

discussed quite at length yesterday I think and the argument

4

of defense yesterday was that the best evidence is that tape

5

recording.

6

went back to our office and made some efforts to make sure

7

that we had some speakers here that maybe the audio was a

8

little bit better.

9

that Pat actually worked on it as well and we have a little

My concern is you couldn't hear it very well.

We

And, and we've come prepared and I think

10

bit better than the PA.

11

conversation yesterday presented that way.

So we did come prepared based on our

As far as redaction, we haven't done anything to

12

---

As far as the presentation of the evidence we

13

redact it.

I do know from past experience redacting

14

something that's from the court record recordings is kind of

15

hard, there's proprietary things on there that make it a

16

little bit difficult but the question on redaction though is

17

it doesn't need to be because - and, you know, have we made

18

efforts to redact it?

19

cart a little bit before the horse.

20

to be redacted.

21

testimony the defense referred to yesterday is on Page 6 of

22

that transcript and it's during Ms. Singleton's cross

23

examination of this witness and it's about when, the

24

question, the context of this is he's asking - she's asking

25

the witness when he had lived with the defendant and on the

No. But that I think is getting the
I don't think it needs

There isn't anything in there.

The

11

1

bottom of Page 6, 184 is the question is like "a couple days,

2

couple weeks, couple months?"

3

don't, I stopped staying there until - I stopped staying

4

there mostly (inaudible) and I when I found my bike ended up

5

missing."

6

inadmissible because it's some sort of character evidence and

7

there's been no 404 - this isn't character evidence.

8

in no way a pertinent trait of character of the defendant.

9

There's not even an accusation in there that the defendant is

--~...

I think that the motion yesterday was that this is

This is

10

the one who took the bike.

11

several ways.

12

certainly doesn't give rise to the need for a 404B hearing.

13

This is a mayhem case.

14

this case.

It could have ended up missing

This is a completely innocuous statement that

There's not even a theft involved in

Ummm, and so, and so our position is that, is that

15

.---.

And then he said "Ummrn, I

16

no, we haven't redacted it but it doesn't need to be

17

redacted.

18

incredibly prejudicial that the jury is going to hear, Wow,

19

Gabriel Estrada's bike was missing when he was over at that

20

guy's house?

21

see how a jury could ever, under any circumstances be

22

affected in that way.

23

saying that he just ended up not moving there, not living

24

there 'cause his bike ended up missing.

25

is something that needs to be redacted and it's not going to

This isn't something that is going to be so

He must have bit of Jacob Omar's ear.

I don't

This again, an innocuous statement

I don't think this

12

:1
2

trial in any way.

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. SINGLETON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. SINGLETON:

Defense's Your Honor, may I respond?

- response.
You know, taken in and of itself

7

perhaps, you know - well, I still think that that, you know,

8

the bike ended up missing is problematic but I think it's

9

also in conjunction with Lines 175, 176 and 177 on Page 6

10

when Mr. Estrada is referring to an incident prior to that

11

and prior to this and going on and that's why I didn't stay

12

there and inaudible and I think in conjunction, what this is

13

suggesting is that there was some prior incident with, in

14

between these two parties and there was something going on

15

and I think that that is, I think the jury could maybe infer

16

that something, you know, something else that was perhaps

17

some form of 404B and again, this goes to, you know, the

18

difference between cross examination at a preliminary hearing

19

versus at a trial and what, you know, and what information is

20

elicited, you know, because of the different motive of cross

21

and I think those are our main objections, you know, to the

22

testimony of Gabriel Estrada.

23

.----.

affect the jury or affect the defendant's right to a fair

But Your Honor, again and just so that the record

24

is clear we are renewing our - I think it's proper for the

25

Court to consider the unavailability of Mr. Estrada again
13

.----...

.--..,

1

today even - because it·is germane - even though he may have

2

been subpoenaed for a 2-day trial.

3

relieves the State of the burden to seek him out yesterday

4

and I don't think that they made any effort to do so. And

5

furthermore I don't think that the proffer yesterday,

6

although we agreed to a proffer in terms of what they had

7

done, I don't think that again, if that proffer is still, you

8

know, the sole efforts that they made to obtain Mr. Estrada,

9

I don't think that's sufficient.

I don't think that

You know, the rules of

10

service as outlines on the Court's website required that a

11

person serving process, which I presume in this case would

12

have been somebody from the D.A.'s office, that require that

13

they should legibly document date and time of service,

14

legibly print the person's name and address on the return of

15

service, sign the return of service in substantial compliance

16

with the rules and I don't think that emailing a pastor a

17

subpoena and then just receiving some sort of verbal

18

confirmation that that date was conveyed to a witness is

19

sufficient to demonstrate service or knowledge of the date

20

and especially now on day two when again there's been a whole

21

other afternoon in which efforts could have been made to

22

locate Mr. Estrada.

23

any of this testimony coming in in the first place.

24

think the State has met their burden to show that Mr. Estrada

25

is not available today - or yesterday but we understand the

So I think, we maintain our objection to
I don't

14

1

Court ruled yesterday but again today and so we maintain our

2

objection.

.-~....

----

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LEAVITT:

Okay.

Does the State wish to respond?

As far as the character nature of the

5

parts Ms. Singleton just pointed out, from 174 on when he's

6

talking about - let's look at what it says, not what we can,

7

not what someone may infer from that.

8

had an incident prior to that and prior to this, going on.

9

That's why I didn't stay there."

"But not a week, but I

What does that mean?

He

10

could have gone to jail. He could have had an incident with

11

someone else on the street.

12

where he slipped and fell at a McDonald's, nobody knows.

13

This in no way - in no way creates an unfair inference that

14

the defendant did something wrong, but again, if she's

15

referring to 404B, 404B is an exception to the 404 rule

16

against character evidence.

17

evidence of a person's character or trait of character not

18

admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person

19

acted in conformity with that character trait.

20

this gets us even close to creating some sort of a character

21

inference that something happened with these guys and

22

therefore on this date he was acting the same way that he did

23

that day.

24

rule.

25

He could have had an incident

404 says the prohibited use is

Nothing in

It just doesn't fall within the scope of that

Again, as far as the unavailability, I think I've

-·-----15

1

addressed that.

2

creative.

3

how do the cops find homeless people?

4

hard to do and so we found someone who actually knew him, who

5

had contact with him and he served him a subpoena for today.

6

We didn't do anything else but I think it stands to reason

7

that after we were, after we broke for the day yesterday and

8

knew we were coming back today for this trial, we were

9

hearing how that testimony is going to be heard and the Court

10

made a ruling that in this trial, this witness is going to be

11

unavailable.

12

yesterday and then continued it yesterday, we may need to do

13

a little bit more work.

14

jury is dismissed, knowing that we're going back in 23 hours,

15

and the Court rules that this witness is unavailable for this

16

trial and again, it's a 2-day subpoena, he's not here today.

17

I don't think that there's anything else that we needed to do

18

so and so we'd ask the Court to deny the continuance, we're

19

ready to go forward today.

20

---

I actually think the way we did it was quite

We have a homeless person here and you know what,
Sometimes it's pretty

I can see how if we had addressed that

THE COURT:

But when we have a hearing after the

@

And I am going to rule in favor of the

21

State on these issues.

My ruling was clear yesterday that

22

under the - in terms of Rule 804 that an unavailable witness

23

is unavailable if the proponent party has done reasonable

24

means to try and get them there and it was clear that it was

25

for yesterday and today.

It was a 2-day trial scheduled.

I

',.

16

--

1

agree with the reasoning the State has presented on this as

2

far as that issue goes because I specifically said we're

3

going to have to be dealing with the continuance of the jury

4

not being available on Wednesday.

5

called in on Thursday, and found under those circumstances

6

that the witness was unavailable.

....~.

.--.....

7

The problems with yesterday was how we were going

8

to put on that testimony and that's what all the discussion

9

was.

None of that was changed by the fact that we still

10

couldn't have the jury on Wednesday and even the witness, the

11

other homeless witness was here under the same means and

12

received the same information and so it does not change my

13

ruling because the 2-day trial did, in fact, go into the

14

second date.

15

unavailable.

16

So I'm still finding that he's still

As to the issue of whether or not the testimony

17

going in by the recording is a basis for a continuance, again

18

I am ruling that it is not.

19

testimony of this witness that I'm allowing that there was

20

some bad blood, something going on, simply does not rise to

21

the level of 404B character evidence and so I am not going to

22

preclude that.

23

----.

The jury was going to be

The information that is in the

The argument yesterday and the status was that the

24

defense and the prosecution had looked at the testimony,

25

looked at the unofficial transcript, listened to the
17

1

recordings and ultimately determined before we recessed when

2

Mr. Goins was here and everyone was present, that the

3

recording was the best evidence, not necessarily the easiest

4

way to put it on but the best evidence and that, in fact, was

5

the argument that the defense made and both the Court and the

6

parties have made efforts now to put that in through the

7

recording and we will follow that process.

.. ..-..._.....

...--...__

-·--.

8

Given the two issues then that the defense witness

9

is available for today and tomorrow and is here and present,

10

because it won't be until after work and the fact that the

11

preliminary hearing testimony that I've admitted is coming in

12

through the recording, there doesn't really seem to be any

13

reason to continue an in-custody case where the jury is now

14

here and present to hear it rather than continue it to

15

another date where he would fall back into second or third

16

position.

@

He was number two even in this one.

17

Thank you.

All right.

18

MS. SINGLETON:

Your Honor, may I just, I

19

understand the Court has ruled and I'm not challenging that

20

ruling necessarily I just want to, I mean - I just want to

21

make one other objection for the record just for purposes of

22

appeal.

23

THE COURT:

24

That's absolutely appropriate.

25

You have the benefit of the record.

MS. SINGLETON:

That again we have an objection on
18

----...

1

Page 6 of the preliminary hearing testimony at Line 163 when

2

Mr. Estrada is basically saying I have (inaudible), I needed

3

a place to sleep (inaudible) Star and I.

4

going to be safe, I thought everything was okay."

5

that is objection - I mean, we would object to that as THE COURT:

6
7

MS. SINGLETON:

Tell me the lines

163 and 164.

"I thought I was

going to be safe, I thought everything was okay."

I mean, I

10

thinks that's another reference to some sort of prior, I mean

11

- well, I guess it's 404 but I just would object to that.
THE COURT:

12

---

I think

again.

8

9

I'm to Page 6.

I thought I was

13

objections to Line 163, 164 and 165?

14

MR. LEAVITT:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. LEAVITT:

17

Anything response to the defendant's

No, Your Honor, I feel the same way The argument - you can create inferences from any

of it -

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. LEAVITT:

20

THE COURT:

- is the same.

Okay.

All right.

- that's the same.
And the record has been made clear and

21

I am overruling the objection on that.

22

want the benefit of the record for anything else because this

23

is the time to put that on even given my rulings.

24

improper at all.

25

MS. SINGLETON:

Thank you.

Do you

That's not
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 22, 2013

2

JUDGE PAUL G. MAUGHAN PRESIDING

3

(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

P R OC E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT: I'm sorry, is this Goins?

7

MS. SINGLETON: Yes, Your Honor.

8

DEFENDANT GOINS: Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT: Goins?

10

State have?
MR. LEAVITT: I anticipate we'll probably call two

11

----

12

witnesses.

13

we'll be fine to go two.

14
15

We have three witnesses subpoenaed, but I think

THE COURT: All right.

Do you waive a formal

reading of Information?

16

MS. SINGLETON: I do, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT: All right.

18
19
20

---

How many witnesses will the

Do you want to call your

first witness?
MR. LEAVITT: Yes, Your Honor.
Gabriel Estrada.

He's in the hallway.

Our first witness is
I'll go grab him.

21

THE COURT: Sure.

22

MR. LEAVITT: And, Your Honor, before Mr. Estrada

23

gets here, Officer Mortensen's now entering the courtroom.

24

don't know if the exclusionary rule's been invoked, but if it

25

is, he's our case agent, so we'll have him remain.

I

1

MS. SINGLETON: Ok~y.

1

I would invoke it for the

--.
2

record, but that's fine.
THE COURT: Okay.

3

GABRIEL ESTRADA

4
5

Having first been duly sworn, testified

6

upon his oath as follows:

7

THE COURT: Come and sit in this chair, sir.

8

Would you state your appearances, please, for the

9

.-------..~

record?

Sorry.

10

MS. SINGLETON: Lacey Singleton for Mr. Goins.

11

MR. LEAVITT: Peter Leavitt for the State.

12

THE COURT: All right, you may proceed.

13

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you.

14
15
16

17

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q

Could you state your name and spell your last name

for the record?

18

A

Gabriel, the last name is Estrada, E-S-T-R-A-D-A.

19

Q

Mr. Estrada, do you know an individual by the name

20

.---...._

Officer may remain.

of Desean Goins?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

How do you know Desean Goins?

23

A

It was a mutual thing, a mutual friendship.

24

Q

How long have you known him?

25

A

I'd say a month.

A month or two.
2

1
------....
2

Q

And do you see Desean Goins in the

courtroom today?

3

A

Yes, I do.

4

Q

Could you point him out and describe where he's

5

6
7

sitting and what he's wearing?
A

He's sitting on my right, in that chair.

He's

wearing black.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Yes, sir.

10

Q

All right, is he sitting next to a woman?

11

A

Yes, sir.

Is he sitting at a table?

12

MS. SINGLETON: Objection, this is leading.

13

THE COURT: Overruled.

14

MR. LEAVITT: Will the record reflect identification

15

of the defendant?
THE COURT: It will.

16

17

Q

(BY MR. LEAVITT) All right.

Did something happen

18

with Mr. Goins back in July that would've brought you to

19

court today?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

All right.

22

·-

A month or two?

Let's talk about it.

Do you remember

the exact date that that happened?

23

A

I do not.

24

Q

Okay, was it - but it was in July?

25

A

Yes, it was in July at Pioneer Park.
3

1

Q

Okay, and is that Pioneer Park here in Salt Lake?

2

A

Yes, it is.

3

Q

All right.

4

A

Well, what happened is -

5

Q

And, I'm sorry, let me just ask you to just - to

6

pull the mica little closer and just speak up a little bit.

7

The room's kind of big.

8

your voice, okay?

9

.. --..,_

A

Okay.

We just want to make sure we get

What happened that day is, supposedly he

10

came up to me at the block, which is 210 Rio Grande, and at

11

the homeless shelter he came up to me with Star saying -

12

Q

Who - sorry, let me stop you, who's Star?

13

A

The young lady in the back.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

Through Myra.

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

We - I knew her before I knew him.

18

19
20

21
22

---.

Tell us what happened?

And how do you know Star?

THE COURT: Mr. Leavitt, is she liable to be a
witness in (inaudible)?
MR. LEAVITT: I think she is - I didn't know who she
was, so, yes.
MS. SINGLETON: I didn't either.

Your - okay.

And

23

so at that point, I - I'm going to have to have you step out

24

of the courtroom.

25

DEFENDANT GOINS: She's a witness for me, sir.
4

MR. LEAVITT: She is a very likely witness in the

1
2

case.

3

THE COURT: All right.

4

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you, Judge.

5
6

Q

said you were at the shelter?
A

Yes.

8

Q

And -

9

A

I was approached by him and her, and -

10

Q

So the defendant and Star, and once they approached

you, what happened?
A

12

He came at me basically in a disrespectful tone

13

saying I stole his• phone, he said, I do a killer (inaudible),

14

mother F-er, pulled out a knife, waived it around basically

15

saying I stole his phone, or saying that I need to get his

16

phone back to him.

17

he would have that (inaudible).
Q

19

out a knife.

20

out?

22

A

And (inaudible) very possible as long as

Now, all right.

18

21

----....

(BY MR. LEAVITT) So, you said your - I think you

7

11

-·---.

You may continue.

So you said that he then pulled

How was he holding the knife when he pulled it

Like anybody else would hold a knife when you're

cutting an apple or an orange, basically.

(Inaudible).

23

Q

So, it was in his hand?

24

A

In his hand.

25

Q

Okay, so I just want to get an idea of how exactly
5

1

he was holding it.

Was he holding it up high?

2

holding it down low?

Was he

.-.......

Just give us a little more description.

3

A

(Inaudible) .

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

That's how he was holding it.

6

Q

And when he was holding it, was he facing you, or

7

was he standing away from you?

8

A

He was facing me.

9

Q

About how far away from you was he standing when he

10

was holding the knife?

11

A

Like two feet away.

12

Q

I'm sorry?

13

A

Within arm's reach, basically.

14

Q

Okay.

And you said - a moment ago you said he was

15

waving it around.

16

description of how he was waving it around?

17
18
19

A

Could you give us a little bit more

I would say, he had the knife like this, he was

pretty much - like that.
Q

Okay, so if - so just so that - would it be a fair

20

statement to say that he was moving it back and forth in

21

front of his body?

22

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

23

Q

Is that a yes?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Okay.

...-...__

6

1

A

That's a yes.

2

Q

All right.

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Okay.

.. --... ....

5

out, did he pull the knife out before or after he had said

6

the statement about killing any mother F-er who took his

7

phone?

8

A

9

10

Before, and it was in his hand.

That's - after

(inaudible) saying that I need to get his phone back, then he
pulled out a knife.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

And that's when he started saying about stabbing

13

someone, killing someone.

14

Q

All right.

15

A

I

After he said that, what happened next?

told him I didn't have anything to do with that.

16

I told him what happened.

17

clothes ready, I got ready, and I left.

18

friend, was awake before I was.

I told him I woke up, I got my
His home boy, or his

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

I told him, I don't have it, told him I didn't have

So, what - how did the confrontation end?

21

to do anything with it, it's not my problem, it's his.

22

walked away.

23

Q

24

----

And did he - when he - he pulled the knife

25

And I

When you walked away, did you see what the

defendant did?
A

No, I just walked away from the situation.

I
7

~-·-

..

1

didn't want to be in it.

2
3

Q

defendant that day?

4

A

When he got arrested.

5

Q

Okay.

And about how long after the confrontation

6

you had with him at the shelter was it until you saw when he

7

was getting arrested?

8

A

Half-hour.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

It would have been 30 minutes from me walking

11

around the block and finding out that Myra is leaving, and

12

finding out that she is (inaudible) blood from right here,

13

and -

14

Q

Is Myra known by another name?

15

A

Jacob Omar.

16

Q

Okay.

And at the beginning of this, I asked you if

17

the Pioneer Park was in Salt Lake County.

18

(inaudible) where this incident occurred, is that in Salt

19

Lake County as well?

20

A

22

The shelter you

Yes.
MR. LEAVITT: Okay. Thank you. I have no further

21

questions for this witness.
THE COURT: Thank you.

23

.-..

So, did you have any more encounters with the

24

Ill

25

Ill
8

CROSS EXAMINATION

1
.--..,
2

3
4

·-

Q

So, Mr. Estrada, you were staying at the shelter

back in July?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

With Mr. - with Mr. Goins?

7

A

Not with him.

8

Q

Not with him?

9

A

Huh-uh (negative).

10

Q

But you knew him from there; is that correct?

11

A

No.

12

Q

You - you knew him from somewhere else?

13

A

I had met him is when I needed a place to sleep is

14

with Star.

15

everything was okay with him.

And I

thought I was going to be safe, I

thought

16

Q

Okay, so you were friends with - you knew Star.

17

A

(Inaudible) .

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

Him.

20

Q

Okay.

21

-.

BY MS. SINGLETON:

And that's how you met Desean?
Yes.
And so you did stay, then, with Sean - or

with Desean and Star at one point in time?

22

A

A week.

23

Q

A week or so?

24

A

And -

25

Q

How long was that?
9

1
.. ---...

Well, not a week, it was a few - that I had an

,

2

incident prior to that, prior to this that's going on now,

3

and that's why I didn't stay there any more.

4

(inaudible)-

5
6
7

8
9

Q

Desean?
A

I didn't

Okay, but - so how long did you stay with Star and
About a week?
I would say within months, but ranging going back

and forth and staying there a few nights {inaudible).
Q

Okay.

So - but when was the last time that you -

10

do you recall when the last time you stayed with them was

11

prior to this incident on this day?

12

A

I don't recall.

13

Q

Like a couple days, couple weeks, couple months?

14

A

I stopped staying there until - I stopped staying

15

there - well, sleeping there at night is when I found out my

16

bike end up missing.

17

....-.._...

A

Q

Okay.

So, you - on this day, you were at the

18

shelter, and you said that Desean approached you in the

19

shelter?

20

A

Not in the shelter.

Outside of it.

21

Q

Outside of it?

22

A

He was walking from his apartment that's in Rose

23

Park off of 800 all the way down.

I don't know the exact

24

address.

25

me, and he walked off to the park, and I was still on the

It was close to the tracks, is when he approached

10

1

men's side of the shelter.

.s----..
2
3

So this encounter with him occurred sort of

on the men's side of the shelter?
A.

Yeah.

5

Q

Okay, right outside of it?

Okay.

What - was there

anybody else around at that point?

7

A

Not really, it was just me and him and his girl.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

There was people probably around observing, but not

10

in it.

11

Q

Okay.

You said earlier that you told Desean that

12

you had - that by the time you woke up that morning, his home

13

boy was already awake?

Is that -

14

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

15

Q

Now, who is that?

16

A

(Inaudible), but I don't recall his last name.

17

Q

Okay, what - so, what was the relevance of that -

18

what was the point of that, that - were you staying next to

19

him, sleeping next - I mean, sleeping near him or something?

20

---

Okay.

4

6

-----..

Q

A

No, it is - I went there because I was tired and I

21

wanted to sleep somewhere besides outside.

So I went there

22

and fell asleep there, because I had to get my clothes ready.

23

I wanted my clothes ironed.

24

there that night - or the night before.

25

he was awake.

And he was there before I got
Then when I wake up,

11

1
2

..

----....

And so - so when he approached you - and you

said he was being disresp~ctful?

3

A

Yeah.

4

Q

What do you mean by that?

5

A

Vulgar.

6

Q

Vulgar?

7

A

High tone, attitude.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Yeah, he thought I stole his phone and sold it.

10

Q

Okay.

And he thought you had his phone, correct?

When - do you recall when the last time - so

11

before - so before this day, when was the last time you saw

12

Desean prior to this?

Had he been -

13

A

(Inaudible) that night.

14

Q

Huh?

15

A

That night.

16

Q

The night before?

,

17
18
19

@

With his friend who was staying

in the shelter?

Mrnm, his friend wasn't in the shelter.

A

He was

there at his apartment that night.

20

Q

You were at Desean's apartment that night?

21

A

I didn't stay there, but I don't like staying there

22
23

24
..-........

Okay.

Q

25

that much.
Q

Okay, but you were there the night before.

Okay.

That's a yes?
THE COURT: Is that a yes?

12

THE WITNESS:

1

----

.

2
3

4

..

ready, like I said.
Q

(BY MS. SINGLETON) Okay.

A

Mmm.

6

Q

Yes?

7

A

Yes.

8

MS. SINGLETON: Okay.

9

THE COURT: Anything else?

10

MR. LEAVITT: No further questions, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Estrada.

You may

step down.

13
14

MR. LEAVITT: Our next witness is Jacob Omar, he's
in the hall.

15

I'll go grab him.

THE COURT: If you'd come up and be sworn, please.
JACOB OMAR

16

17

Having first been duly sworn, testified

18

upon his oath as follows:

19

THE COURT: Come and sit in this chair, please.

20

MR. LEAVITT: May I proceed?

21

THE COURT: You may proceed.

22

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

23
24

·--

So that happened at

Desean's place.

5

12

.---

Yes, because I had to get my clothes

25

BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q

Could you state your name and spell your last name
13
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Case Summary

Procedural Posture

Defendant was convicted by a Colorado trial court of second degree assault and second
degree murder. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, stating that there was a
bright-line rule prohibiting the use of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable
witness. It held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
remanded the case for a new trial. The supreme court granted certiorari to review.

Overview

The supreme court had to decide whether a prior case categorically excluded all
preliminary hearing testimony, even when it met the two-part test of unavailability and
reliability and would be admissible under a hearsay exception other than Colo. R. Evid.
804; and whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The supreme
court noted, however, that its Confrontation Clause inquiry was changed to whether a
defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine, not whether the
previous testimony was reliable. The preliminary hearing did not provide an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements.
The trial court denied defendant his right to an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses against him. The prosecution did not show that the error in admitting the
witness's testimony absent an adequate opportunity for defendant to cross-examine was
harmless. The prosecution relied on the witness's testimony. other witnesses were
subject to attack, and the witness's testimony was contradicted by defendant's version
of events. The overall strength of the prosecution's case was questionable.

Outcome

The judgment was affirmed.
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Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v- > ~
Evidence v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~
Cross-Examination

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > ~ Unavailability v
HN1A- Previous testimony of a witness is admissible only if the witness is unavailable
and the defendant had an adequate prior opportunity for cross-examination. Shepardize
- Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights ... > Criminal Process v >
Right to Confrontation

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v- > General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials...,. > Defendant's Rights v > ~
Rig ht to Confrontation ...,.
HN2A A defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is guaranteed by both
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Colo. Const. art. II, § 16.
Even without the state provision guaranteeing this right, the United States Supreme
Court has held that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. Shepardize - Narrow by this
Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v >
Right to Confrontation

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights ... > General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v- > Defendant's Rights v > ~
Right to Confrontation

v

HN3~ The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process
Right to Confrontation

v

>

v

HN4~ See Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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®
Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights
Right to Confrontation

v

> Criminal Process v >

v

HNSA. Although the federal Confrontation Clause does not include specific language
requiring face to face confrontation, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that simply as a
matter of English it confers at least a right to meet face to face all those who appear and
give evidence at trial. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process
Right to Confrontation

v

>

v

HN6& The purposes behind both the federal and state Confrontation Clauses are well
articulated. The Confrontation Clause is designed to ensure that convictions are not
obtained through the use of ex parte affidavits. Testimony is much more reliable when it
is given under oath at trial where the witness can be cross-examined and the jury may
observe the witness's demeanor. Thus, although by necessity exceptions to the right of
confrontation must exist, courts have continually maintained the importance of that
right. Accordingly, courts must protect the most obvious manifestation of that right-the
opportunity for cross-examination. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process
Right to Confrontation

v

>

v

HN7~ The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him has been regarded
as a fundamental right for hundreds of years. It was included in both the United States
and Colorado Constitutions to insure that persons would not be convicted on the basis of
ex parte testimony and without the benefit of cross-examination. This right remains
crucial to the adversarial system of law. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

®

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process..,.. >
Right to Confrontation

v

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights v > State Application v
HNB~ The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to state
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment and Colorado courts have followed
U.S. Supreme Court law regarding the Confrontation Clause. Shepardize - Narrow by
this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v >
Right to Confrontation v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~
Evidence v
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HN91:. The Confrontation Clause provides a procedural, not a substantive, guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. Therefore, the flaw in the
Roberts test is that it allows judges to substitute their determinations of amorphous
notions of reliability for a jury's determination. Admitting statements deemed reliable by
a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. The Confrontation
Clause applies to "witnesses" or those who 11 bear testimony. 11 "Testimonial" is not defined
comprehensively, but it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights,,. > Criminal Process v >
Right to Confrontation ...
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >
General Overview

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~
Evidence v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~
Cross-Examination

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > General Overview.,.,.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses,,. > ~ Unavailability v
Evidence > Types of Evidence v > Testimony v > General Overview,,.
Evidence > ... > Examination

v

> Cross-Examinations v > General Overview v

HNlO~ The Supreme Court has refocused its analysis of Confrontation Clause
violations, mandating not that evidence necessarily be reliable, but that its reliability be
assessed in a particular manner--through cross-examination. The Crawford test
therefore limits the admissibility of testimonial evidence, which includes preliminary
hearing testimony, to that of unavailable witnesses whom the accused has had an
adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Confrontation Clause inquiry is
changed to whether a defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine,
not whether the previous testimony is reliable. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights ... > Criminal Process ... >
Right to Confrontation

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > General Overview

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >
General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >
Entitlement v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings ... > Preliminary Hearings v > ~
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Evidence v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >
Procedural Matters v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v > ~
Right to Confrontation...,
Evidence > ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations ... > General Overview v
HN11~ A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of
probable cause. The rights of the defendant are therefore curtailed: evidentiary and
procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce
evidence are limited to the question of probable cause. A defendant has no constitutional
right to unrestricted confrontation of witnesses and to introduce evidence at a
preliminary hearing. By rule, defendants have the right to a preliminary hearing under
certain circumstances, and pursuant to the rule a defendant may cross-examine
witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf, Colo. R. Crim. P.
7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is not intended to be a mini-trial or to afford
the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery. Hence, a preliminary hearing does not
provide the same safeguards as a trial. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers v > Judges v > General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > General Overview

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings ... >
General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~
Evidence

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >
Procedural Matters v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v > ~
Right to Confrontation ...,
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > Credibility v
Evidence > Types of Evidence v > Testimony v > General Overview v
Evidence> ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations v > General Overview v
HN12A- The judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a determination
of probable cause. A judge may not engage in credibility determinations unless the
testimony is incredible as a matter of law. Aside from the exceptionally rare instance of
credibility as an issue of law, defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage in
credibility inquiries and may be prohibited from doing so. Thus, the right to crossexamination may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances.
Because credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, once a prima
facie case for probable cause is established, there is little defense counsel can do to
show that probable cause does not exist. Therefore, as a practical matter, defense
counsel may decline to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing,
understanding that the cross-examination would have no bearing on the issue of
probable cause and that the judge may limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus the
opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is very limited. Further, the
opportunity for cross-examination regarding the credibility of a witness, as a matter of
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fact, exists only to the extent that an attorney persists in asking questions that have no
bearing on the issues before the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited
by the court. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Criminal Law & Procedure> Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >
General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v > ~
Evidencev
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Defendant's Rights v > ~
Rig ht to Confrontation v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~
Cross-Examination,..
HN13A. The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the
opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the
witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the
merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of
determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. Shepardize Narrow by this Headnote

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings,.. > General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings,.. > Preliminary Hearings v >
General Overview

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v >

(§1

Evidence,..
Criminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings v > Preliminary Hearings v- >
Procedural Matters T
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v- > Defendant's Rights,,. >
Right to Confrontation

[§

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v- > Examination of Witnesses
Cross-Examination

v

>~

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > General Overview v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v > ~ Unavailability v
Evidence > Types of Evidence v > Testimony v > General Overview
Evidence > ... > Examination

v

v

> Cross-Examinations v > General Overview

v

Evidence > ... > Examination v > Cross-Examinations,.. > Scope v
HN1.4:I;. The preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements. A
preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. It
prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a mini-trial which would expend time
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and resources the judiciary does not possess. Changing the purpose of these hearings
would impact all criminal cases, not just those with Confrontation Clause issues.
Preliminary hearings are limited to a determination of probable cause so that they do not
become mini-trials. Were the courts to allow extensive cross-examination by defense
counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation Clause viola~ions at trial if a witness were to
become unavailable, it would turn the preliminary hearing in every case into a much
longer and more burdensome process for all parties involved. Therefore, the supreme
court does not expand the scope of preliminary hearings in order to allow them to satisfy
Confrontation Clause requirements. Rather, it merely reiterates a prior holding; although
a defendant must have been provided with a prior adequate opportunity to crossexamine an unavailable witness before the State can admit that witness's previous
testimony into evidence, the preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause
requirements. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Examination of Witnesses v > ~
Cross-Examination v
HN15A Cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > ... > Fundamental Rights v > Criminal Process v >
Right to Confrontation v
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Burdens of Proof v > General Overview

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Burdens of Proof v > Prosecution v
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v >
General Overview

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v >
Constitutional Rights v
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review v > Harmless & Invited Error v >
Evidence?
Evidence > Burdens of Proof y > Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt v
HN16ia Two types of constitutional error exist: structural errors, which affect the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself; and trial errors, which occur during the presentation of the case to the
jury and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented. Structural errors require automatic reversal. Trial errors require reversal
unless an appellate court determines that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless.
Confrontation Clause violations are trial errors. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials..., > Examination of Witnesses v > ~
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Cross-Examination

v

Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials v > Witnesses v >

~ Presentation...,.

Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Standards of Review

v

> Harmless & Invited Error v >

General Overview v
Evidence > Admissibility v > Procedural Matters v > Rulings on Evidence v
HN17~ The inquiry in a harmless error analysis is whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error, and not whether, in a trial
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered.
Factors a reviewing court should consider include, the importance of the witness'
testimony to the prosecution 1s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the
presence or absence of corroborating or contradictory evidence on the material points of
the witness' testimony, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the
overall strength of the prosecution's case. Thus, a reviewing court must look at the trial
as a whole and decide whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant could
have been prejudiced by the error. If so, the error is not harmless and the reviewing
court must reverse the conviction below. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

•

Headnotes/Syllabus

Head notes
Confrontation Clause - Preliminary Hearing - Unavailable Witness

Syllabus
In this case involving a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, the supreme
court considers the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354, No. 02-9410, 2004 WL 413301 (U.S. Mar. 8,
2004). In line with that decision, the supreme court holds that before a witness 1s previous
testimony can be used at trial, the witness must be unavailable to testify at trial and the
defendant must have had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness. The
supreme court reiterates its holding in People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979)
that because of the limited scope of the preliminary hearing in Colorado, that hearing does
not provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination sufficient to meet Confrontation
Clause requirements.
Thus, in this case, the supreme court holds that an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing
testimony was improperly admitted at trial. As the court finds that the error was not
harmless, the case is remanded for a new trial.

Counsel: Ken Salazar, Attorney [**2] General Paul Koehler, Assistant Attorney General
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Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Petitioner.

David S. Kaplan v, Colorado State Public Defender Alan Kratz v, Deputy State Public Defender
Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent.

Judges: JUSTICE MARTINEZ v delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE COATS v dissents,
and JUSTICE KOURLIS v joins in the dissent.

Opinion by: MARTINEZ v

Opinion
[ *972] EN BANC
JUSTICE MARTINEZ v delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE COATS v dissents, and JUSTICE KOURLIS v joins in the dissent.

@

I. Introduction
In this case, we consider whether the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness
is admissible at trial. In accordance with the United States Supreme Court1 s recent decision in
Crawford v. Washinqton,541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354, No. 02-9410, 2004
WL 413301 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2004), we hold that HNlY previous testimony is admissible only if
the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an adequate prior opportunity for crossexamination. Because preliminary hearings in Colorado do not present an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination, we find that the trial court erred in admitting preliminary
hearing testimony. The error in this case was not harmless. Therefore, [**3] we affirm the
court of appeals' decision remanding the case for a new trial.

II. Facts and Procedure

The victim in this case, Darla Fischer, died as a result of complications related to a cerebral
hemorrhage that was caused by an impact to the head. At trial, the parties disputed whether
a fall or an assault caused the [*973] injury. A jury convicted Respondent Richard Fry,
Fischer's boyfriend at the time, of second degree assault and second degree murder for
Fischer•s death.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution called FrY-s uncle, Ario Gene Burgess, to testify.
Burgess testified that about two days after Fischer was hospitalized, Fry telephoned him and
stated that "Darla [Fischer] was in the hospital and that he had put her there." Burgess
further stated that Fry had told him he had hit Fischer and that he thought she had brain
damage. However, Fry telephoned him again about two weeks later, Burgess testified, and
told him that he had "no hand in it, that somebody else had done that.
11

Defense counsel did not cross-examine Burgess at the preliminary hearing. Burgess died
before trial.
After Burgess died, Fry 1s counsel filed a Motion to Exclude Hearsay Testimony [**4] of Ario
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Gene Burgess. Fry argued that Burgess's preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible at
trial pursuant to the Confrontation Clause in article II, section 16, of the Colorado
Constitution, and this court's decision in People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979).
Moreover, the defense contended that Burgess had a motive to lie because he had allegedly
been assaulted by Fry and because he had been intimately involved with Fry's girlfriend,
Fischer. The prosecution countered that the testimony was admissible under the residual
hearsay exception because the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine Burgess at the
preliminary hearing. Additionally, the prosecution asserted that the testimony was reliable
because Burgess had no motive to lie.
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that Burgess's testimony was admissible under the
residual hearsay exception, C.R.E. 807. The trial court reasoned that although People v. Smith
prohibits the use of preliminary hearing testimony under C.R.E. 804, such testimony can be
admitted pursuant to another hearsay exception which meets the two part test of
unavailability and reliability as set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L Ed. 2d 597, 100
S. Ct. 2531 (1980), [**5] and People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1983). The case then
went to trial and Fry was convicted.
The court of appeals reversed. People v. Fry, 74 P.3d 360 (Colo. App. 2002). It stated that
Smith established a bright-line rule prohibiting the use of preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness. Id. at 364. Further, the court of appeals reasoned that although Smith
was decided before Roberts and Dement, it "essentially determined that preliminary hearing
testimony does not possess the requisite trustworthiness" to satisfy the reliability prong of the
Roberts test. Id. Thus, the court of appeals found that the testimony was improperly
admitted. Id. Additionally, the court of appeals held that the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 365. The court noted that the prosecution relied heavily on Burgess's
testimony and that the other incriminating evidence was ambiguous and insufficient to
support the conviction. Id. The court of appeals therefore remanded the case for a new trial.
Id.
We granted certiorari to review two questions: first, whether Smith [**6] should be read to
categorically exclude all preliminary hearing testimony, even when that testimony meets the
two-part test of unavailability and reliability and would be admissible under a hearsay
exception other than C.R.E. 804, the exception discussed in Smith; and second, whether any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. !_1.!.!
[**7] [*974] In the time between briefing and oral argument in this case, however, the
United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington. which overruled Roberts.
Crawford v. Washington, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, No. 02-9410, 2004 WL 413301 (U.S. Mar. 8,
2004). The Court held that testimonial statements of an unavailable witness are not
admissible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Consequently,
we now review the questions before us in light of Crawford.

III. Confrontation Clause
To answer the questions before us, we first briefly review the purposes and history behind the
Confrontation Clause. Next, we examine the progression of United States Supreme Court
cases analyzing the Confrontation Clause and our own interpretation and application of those
cases. We then outline the nature and purpose of preliminary hearings in Colorado and how
they impact our Confrontation Clause analysis. We then apply this analysis to the case before
us and find that the use of a transcript from the preliminary hearing as evidence at trial
violated Fry's right to confront the witnesses against him. Finally, we review the court of
appeals' decision to determine [**8] whether the error in this case was harmless. We agree
with the court of appeals' decision that the prosecution did not show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error was harmless. Thus, we affirm the court of appeals decision remanding
the case for a new trial.
A. Confrontation Clause-Purposes and History
HN2-;; A defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is guaranteed by both the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 16 of the Colorado
Constitution. 12.!._j Even without our state provision guaranteeing this right, the United States
Supreme Court has held that 11 this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and
state prosecutions" through the Fourteenth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 158 L. Ed.
2d 177, 2004 WL 413301 at *5 (citing Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400, 406, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923,
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85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965)).
[**9] The history behind the Confrontation Clause is discussed extensively in Crawford, 158
L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301 at *5-*9. Although we do not discuss it at length here, we
review the Clause 1s history briefly to illustrate the importance of the right to confrontation in
our system of law.
The concept that an accused has the right to confront the witnesses against him dates back to
Roman times, but was incorporated into English law in the 1600s. Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d
177, 2004 WL 413301 at *5-*6. English courts developed the right, allowing out-of-court
testimony only if the witness was unable to testify in person. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, [WL] at *6.
English courts further developed the common law to require that statements made before trial
were admissible only if the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id.
Although several state constitutions included a right of confrontation, the United States
Constitution did not originally include that right. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, IYYJJ at *8. Following
criticism regarding the omission, the First Congress included the right in the Sixth
Amendment. Id. The People of Colorado included a right to confrontation of witnesses against
an accused in Colorado's [**10] original constitution and it has remained unchanged since
that time. See Colo. Const. art. II, § 16.
HN6~ [*975] The purposes behind both the federal and state Confrontation Clauses are
well articulated. We have stated that the Confrontation Clause is designed to ensure that
convictions are not obtained through the use of ex parte affidavits. People v. Bastardo, 191
Colo. 521, 524, 554 P.2d 297, 300 (1976); see also Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL
413301 at *9. We have recognized that testimony is much more reliable when it is given
under oath at trial where the witness can be cross-examined and the jury may observe the
witness's demeanor. People v. Dement, 661 P.2d 675, 680 (Colo. 1983). Thus, although by
necessity exceptions to the right of confrontation must exist, we have continually maintained
the importance of that right. Accordingly, we must protect the most obvious manifestation of
that right-the opportunity for cross-examination. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406-07.

In sum, HN'R the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him has been
regarded as a fundamental right for hundreds of years. It was included in both the [**11]
United States and Colorado Constitutions to insure that persons would not be convicted on
the basis of ex parte testimony and without the benefit of cross-examination. This right
remains crucial to our adversarial system of law.
B. Confrontation Clause Case Law

We first examine the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the Confrontation
Clause. HNB':I The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to state
prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment and we have followed U.S. Supreme Court
law regarding the Confrontation Clause. In addition, we outline our case law and our
interpretation of the Supreme Court's case law.
Until the Supreme Court1s recent decision in Crawford, the test for Confrontation Clause
violations was outlined in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531
(1980), overruled by ~rawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301. In Roberts, the Court
set forth a two-part test to determine whether prior testimony of a hearsay declarant was
admissible. Id. at 65-66. First, the Court stated that the Confrontation Clause required that
the declarant be unavailable to testify at trial. Id. at 65. Second, if [**12] unavailability was
established, the Court found that the Clause approves only statements that bear adequate
indicia of reliability. Id. at 65-66. The Court held that reliability could be inferred where the
testimony fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 66. Before evidence could be
admitted when it did not come under such an exception, the party offering the evidence had
to show that the evidence possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id.
Applying this test in Roberts, the Court found that the Confrontation Clause was not violated
by the introduction of an unavailable witness's preliminary hearing testimony where the
witness had been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 73. The Court held that
"since there was an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], and counsel ...
availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript ... bore sufficient 'indicia of reliability' and
afforded 1the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. 111
Id. (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216, 33 L. Ed. 2d 293, 92 S. Ct. 2308 (1972)).
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We adopted the Roberts test in [**13] Dement, 661 P.2d at 681. In Dement, we reached
only the first prong because we found that the prosecution failed to establish unavailability.
Id. at 681. However, in later cases, we applied the reliability prong of the Roberts test. We
stated that we must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement to
decide whether it possessed the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness. Stevens v. People,
29 P.3d 305, 314 (2001), abrogated by Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301, (citing
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-21, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990)). Although
we noted that courts have "considerable discretion in determining what factors may enhance
or detract from the statement's reliability," we pointed out several factors a court could use.
People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-07 (2001), abrogated by Crawford,158 L. Ed. 2d 177,
2004 WL 413301, [*976] (citing Weight, 497 U.S. at 822). These factors included whether
the statement was detailed, how soon after the events the statement was made, whether the
statement was voluntary, whether the declarant had a motive to (**14] inculpate the
defendant, among others. Id. at 406-07; see also Stevens. 29 P.3d at 314. Thus, our
reliability analyses considered both the procedural setting in which the contested statements
were made as well as the substance of the statements. See id.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford rejects the reliability prong of the Roberts
test in favor of an inquiry into whether the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine witnesses. Crawford, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 WL 413301 at *19. In explaining its
abrogation of the Roberts test, the Court in Crawford begins with the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, (WL] at *9. The Court explains that the "the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused." ML. The Court notes that the common law at the time of the Sixth Amendment's
enactment 11 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and
a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those
limitations." 158 L. Ed. 2d 177,[WL] [**15] at *11.
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision explains that HN9T the Clause provides a procedural,
not a substantive, guarantee. 158 L. Ed. 2d 177,[WL] at *14. "It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination. 11 Id. Therefore, the flaw in the Roberts test is that it allows
judges to substitute their determinations of "amorphous notions of 'reliability"' for a jury's
determination. ML. The Supreme Court cites inconsistent decisions of reliability as a reason
why allowing courts to make reliability determinations about ex parte testimony does not
provide the protection envisioned by the Framers adopting the Confrontation Clause. 159 L.
Ed. 2d 177, LWJJ. at *15 (citing Stevens, 29 P.3d at 316, and Farrell, 34 P.3d at 406-07, as
examples of the inconsistent application of the Roberts test due to the wide range of
sometimes contradictory factors used in the reliability analysis). 11 Admitting statements
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation." 158 L.
Ed. 2d 177, [WL] at *14.
Crawford limits its holding to "testimonial statements," noting that the [**16] Confrontation
Clause applies to 11 witnesses 11 or those who "bear testimony. 11 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, [WL] at *10.
Crawford explicitly declines to define "testimonial 11 comprehensively, but notes that "it applies
at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing." 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, Lw..Ll at *10.
HN10~ The Supreme Court has refocused its analysis of Confrontation Clause violations,
mandating not that evidence necessarily be reliable, but that its reliability be assessed in a
particular manner--through cross-examination. The Crawford test therefore limits the
admissibility of testimonial evidence, which includes preliminary hearing testimony, to that of
unavailable witnesses whom the accused has had an adequate prior opportunity to crossexamine. In light of Crawford, we reject the Roberts reliability analysis that we adopted in
Dement. Consequently, to the extent that Stevens and Fa.rrell and any of our other prior cases
employ that analysis, we overrule those cases. We therefore change our Confrontation Clause
inquiry to whether a defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine, not
whether the previous testimony is reliable.

C. Preliminary Hearings in Colorado
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Before the [**17] holdings of either Roberts or Crawford. we noted that the admissibility of
prior testimony depended on the nature of the proceeding at which the prior testimony was
made. People v. Smith. 198 Colo. 120, 125, 597 P.2d 204, 207 (1979), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1997), overruled by Griego v. People, 19
P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001) (Vance overruled Smith on grounds that materiality is an issue that must
be submitted to the jury; Griego later overruled Vance on the proper standard of review for
such an error). In particular, we examined whether prior testimony given at a preliminary
hearing provided an adequate [*977] opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 125-26, 597
P.2d at 207-08. In deciding that question, we looked to the purpose of the preliminary
hearing. Id. We concluded that due to the limited nature of the preliminary hearing, the
opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id... at
126, 597 P.2d at 208. We now reiterate that holding.
HN11~ A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of probable
cause. [**18] kl at 125, 597 P.2d at 207. The rights of the defendant are therefore
curtailed: evidentiary and procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to cross-examine
witnesses and to introduce evidence are limited to the question of probable cause. Id.

A defendant has no constitutional right to unrestricted confrontation of witnesses
and to introduce evidence at a preliminary hearing. By rule, defendants have the
right to a preliminary hearing under certain circumstances, and pursuant to the
rule a defendant 'may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce
evidence in his own behalf.' Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is
not intended to be a mini-trial or to afford the defendant an opportunity to effect
discovery.
Id. at 125-26, 597 P.2d at 207-08 (quoting Rex v. Sullivan, 194 Colo. 568, 571, 575 P.2d 408,
@

410 (1978)). Hence, a preliminary hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a trial.
Additionally, HN12¥ the judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a
determination of probable cause. gL_ at 125, 597 P.2d at 207. A judge may not engage in
credibility determinations unless the testimony is [** 19] incredible as a matter of law. liL. at
126, 597 P.2d at 208; Hunter v. Dist. Court. 190 Colo. 48, 52-53, 543 P.2d 1265, 1268
(1975); People v. Ramirez, 30 P.3d 807, 809 (Colo. 2001) (Testimony is "incredible as a
matter of law" if it is "in conflict with nature or fully established or conceded facts. It is
testimony as to facts which the witness physically could not have observed or events that
could not have happened under the laws of nature."). Aside from the exceptionally rare
instance of credibility as an issue of law, defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage
in credibility inquiries and may be prohibited from doing so. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 P.2d
at 208; Hunter, 190 Colo. at 52-53, 543 P.2d at 1268. Thus, the right to cross-examination
may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances. Id. Because
credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, once a prima facie case for
probable cause is established, there is little defense counsel can do to show that probable
cause does not exist. Therefore, as a practical matter, defense counsel may decline to [**20]
cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, understanding that the crossexamination would have no bearing on the issue of probable cause and that the judge may
limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus we conclude that the opportunity for crossexamination at a preliminary hearing is very limited. Further, the opportunity for crossexamination regarding the credibility of a witness, as a matter of fact, exists only to the
extent that an attorney persists in asking questions that have no bearing on the issues before
the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited by the court.
Given the limited nature of the preliminary hearing in Colorado, we held in Smith that the
Colorado Confrontation Clause "precludes the admission of the transcript of a preliminary
hearing at a subsequent trial when the witness whose testimony is sought has become
unavailable." lg...!. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208 (compare California v. Green. 399 U.S. 149, 26 L.
Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970) (in California case, where preliminary hearing constitutes a
mini-trial, unavailable witness's prior testimony at preliminary hearing admissible)). We relied
in Smith on the [**21] Supreme Court's analysis in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 255, 88 S. Ct. 1318 (1968), that "there has traditionally been an exception to the
confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous
judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by
that defendant." The Supreme Court first held in Barber that the state did not establish
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unavailability. Id. at 724-25. [*978] Additionally, it rejected the notion that the defendant
had waived his right to confront the witness by not cross-examining him at the preliminary
hearing. Id. at 725. The Court noted that even if defense counsel had cross-examined the
witness at the preliminary hearing, the Confrontation Clause still would not be satisfied on the
facts of that case. Id. Citing the differences between a trial and a preliminary hearing, the
Court concluded that cross-examination at the preliminary hearing would not have provided
the same opportunity for exploration into the case. Id.
HN13W:, The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the
opportunity to cross-examine and the [**22] occasion for the jury to weigh the
demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less
searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its
function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to
hold the accused for trial.

Id. The Court's decision in Barber --that the exception to the right of confrontation arises only
when a witness is unavailable and previously gave testimony that was subject to crossexamination by the defendant --thus foreshadowed its decision in Crawford requiring the
same.
Thus, we have held that HN14':i the preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation
Clause requirements. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208; see also Commonwealth v.
SmittJ., 436 Pa. Super. 277, 647 A.2d 907, 912-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)(because issue of
credibility important at trial, and because credibility not an issue at preliminary hearing,
preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible because defendant did not have a "full and fair
opportunity for cross-examination"); cf. People v. Rosa, 302 A.D.2d 231, 231-32, 754
N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (suppression [**23] hearing did not provide full and fair
opportunity for cross-examination; little incentive to impeach credibility); Nazworth v. State,
352 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. App. 1977) (bond hearing, the purpose of which was limited to
setting bond, did not afford defendant a proper opportunity for cross-examination). Other
states are split on whether a preliminary hearing provides an adequate opportunity for crossexamination. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility Or Use In
Criminal Trial Of Testimony Given At Preliminary Proceeding By Witness Not Available At Trial,
38 A.LR.4th 378, § 6 (2004). Nonetheless, we do not wish to change the scope of the
preliminary hearing by overruling our decision in Smith that a preliminary hearing does not
provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. As the Attorney General recognized in
oral argument, Smith is good law; it prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a
mini-trial which would expend time and resources the judiciary does not possess. Changing
the purpose of these hearings would impact all criminal cases, not just those with
Confrontation Clause issues. Preliminary [**24] hearings are limited to a determination of
probable cause so that they do not become mini-trials. Were we to allow extensive crossexamination by defense counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation Clause violations at trial if
a witness were to become unavailable, we would turn the preliminary hearing in every case
into a much longer and more burdensome process for all parties involved. Therefore, we do
not expand the scope of preliminary hearings in order to allow them to satisfy Confrontation
Clause requirements. Rather, we merely reiterate our holding in Smith; although a defendant
must have been provided with a prior adequate opportunity to cross-examine an unavailable
witness before the State can admit that witness's previous testimony into evidence, the
preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements.

D. Application

Before proceeding with our Confrontation Clause analysis, we point out what we do not
discuss here. First, we do not delve into whether the preliminary hearing testimony would be
admissible under a hearsay exception. Although admissibility under a hearsay
exception [**25] may have lent support to a finding of reliability under the Roberts test, in
light of Crawford, such a determination is [*979] no longer relevant. Even were we to find
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the preliminary hearing testimony to meet the requirements of the residual hearsay
exception, Fry's right to confrontation was violated nonetheless as a result of the lack of an
adequate opportunity for cross-examination pursuant to Crawford and Smith. Stevens, 29
P.3d at 311 ( Although an out-of-court statement may be admissible because it falls within an
exception to the hearsay rule, the statement nevertheless must be excluded at a criminal trial
if admitting it into evidence would deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him."). Thus, as we would find a Confrontation Clause
violation in either case, we need not address whether the preliminary hearing testimony
meets the requirements of the residual hearsay exception. Second, we do not address the
unavailability prong of the Crawford test. It is uncontested that Burgess passed away prior to
trial and was therefore unavailable.
11

This case exemplifies the dangers of admitting preliminary [**26] hearing testimony as
evidence at trial when the witness is unavailable. Burgess made several statements
incriminating Fry at the preliminary hearing. Although Burgess 1s credibility was factually
subject to attack, credibility determinations are not allowed at preliminary hearings. See
Hunter, 190 Colo. at 52-53, 543 P.2d at 1268. Thus, Burgess's testimony could not be
subjected to the procedural rigors required by the Confrontation Clause at the preliminary
hearing. Moreover, the trial court further allowed the testimony to skirt the procedural
safeguards of the Confrontation Clause by allowing the testimony to be read aloud at trial, by
a police officer, without the opportunity for immediate rebuttal. The testimony was therefore
never subject to direct attack. The process employed in this case illustrates how dispensing
with an adequate opportunity for cross-examination impedes a defendant from having a
proper chance to rebut the evidence against him.
To start, Burgess made several statements incriminating Fry at the preliminary hearing.
Defense counsel did not cross-examine Burgess. Nonetheless, there were several reasons to
question Burgess's credibility. First, [**27] Burgess had motive to lie. He stated that he had
been assaulted by Fry in the past. Additionally, defense counsel presented evidence that
showed that Burgess was involved intimately with the victim, who was Fry1s girlfriend at the
time. Moreover, Burgess's character was not flawless. He had a history of criminal convictions
and evidence indicated that he was constantly intoxicated. Finally, Burgess was hard of
hearing and it was necessary to shout when speaking to him on the telephone. Thus, his
testimony regarding telephone conversations with Fry was not necessarily accurate. In short,
the preliminary hearing did not provide an adequate opportunity for Fry to confront Burgess
and reveal these issues of credibility.
The introduction of Burgess's testimony at trial further demonstrated the importance of the
right to confrontation. At trial, a police officer read Burgess's testimony to the jury. Although
the trial court allowed Fry to present evidence that indirectly questioned Burgess's testimony,
it denied Fry's request that he be allowed t.o rebut the testimony immediately after it was
read. Thus, the procedure followed by the trial court did not allow any opportunity for Fry
to [**28] attempt to rebut the testimony against him.
Because Burgess's testimony was not subject to cross-examination, or tested through any
other means, it was allowed to stand unrebutted, its truth completely unquestioned. The
evidence which brought to light some of the credibility issues was not allowed until Fry's
case-in-chief, much later in the trial. Thus, the effect of that rebuttal was greatly diminished.
Even if the trial court had allowed the evidence immediately after Burgess's testimony,
however, such indirect contradictions do not carry the force of cross-examination. As the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated, HN1~ cross-examination is the 'greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth."' Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 Wigmore § 1367).
This case illustrates the truth of that statement. Indirect rebuttal evidence cannot have the
same effect on a jury as answers to questions put directly to the witness on crossexamination. Here the witness might [*980] have been confronted with whether he was in
fact intimately involved with Fry's girlfriend; whether he had a drinking problem; whether he
had been drinking before his testimony at the preliminary hearing; [**29] whether he had a
hearing problem; and whether he had a particularly hard time hearing on the telephone. A
skilled cross-examiner can confront a dishonest witness, or a witness who is mistaken, with
questions that cause the witness to see the corner he has painted himself into and react in a
way that permits the jury to judge credibility from what it hears and sees. Thus, a witness's
testimony on cross-examination may be much more damning to the witness's credibility than
any sort of indirect evidence the defense can offer. In sum, the opportunity for crossexamination is without equal as a tool in the search for truth. Therefore, by admitting the
preliminary hearing testimony of Burgess at trial, the trial court denied Fry his right to an
11
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adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. As such, Fry's right to
confront the witnesses against him was also denied.

IV. Harmless Error Analysis

Having established that the admission of Burgess's testimony at trial constituted
constitutional error, we must now determine whether the error was harmless.

HN16~ Two types of constitutional error exist: structural errors, which affect the "framework
within which the trial [**30] proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself";
and trial errors, which occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury and ... may
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented." Blecha v.
People, 962 P.2d 931, 942 (Colo. 1998) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310,
307-08, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)). Structural errors require automatic
reversal. Id. Trial errors require reversal unless an appellate court determines that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The prosecution bears the burden of proving
that the error was harmless. Id. Confrontation Clause violations are trial errors. ML. Thus, in
this case, the prosecution must prove that the trial court's error in admitting Burgess's
testimony absent an adequate opportunity for Fry to cross-examine Burgess was harmless.
We find that the prosecution did not make that showing.
HN1~ The inquiry in a harmless error analysis is "whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error," and "not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict [**31] would surely have been rendered." Id.
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 124 L Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078
(1993)). Factors a reviewing court should consider include, "the importance of the witness'
testimony to the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of corroborating or contradictory evidence on the material points of the witness'
testimony, the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength
of the prosecution's case." Id. (quoting Merritt v. People, 842 P.2d 162, 169 (Colo. 1992)).
Thus, a reviewing court must look at the trial as a whole and decide whether there is a
reasonable probability that the defendant could have been prejudiced by the error. ML. If so,
the error is not harmless and the reviewing court must reverse the conviction below. Id.
The error in this case was not harmless. Using the factors articulated above, we find that the
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
First, the importance of Burgess's testimony is made clear by looking at the prosecution's
treatment of the evidence. [**32] In its notice of intent to offer Burgess's preliminary
hearing testimony, the prosecution stated that Burgess's testimony was "more probative on
the issue of what happened to Darla Fischer than any other evidence in existence." In
addition, the prosecution relied on Burgess's testimony on three different occasions in closing
argument.

@

Second, although the evidence was cumulative in that Burgess's testimony was corroborated
by Fischer's hearsay statements and the testimony of Fry's ex-girlfriend, both witnesses were
also subject to attack.

[ *981] A police officer questioned Fischer about the incident after she underwent surgery to
remove a blood clot on her brain. Because Fischer was unable to speak, the officer asked her
to respond to questions by nodding her head yes or no. Through this officer's testimony, the
prosecution introduced Fischer's hearsay communications that Fry had beaten her. The officer
testified that when he asked whether Fry had caused the injuries, Fischer nodded yes. On
cross-examination, however, defense counsel showed that the officer did not establish
whether Fischer was referring to injuries sustained a few days earlier or to the injury that
caused the cerebral [**33] hemorrhage. Further, the officer testified that he was not certain
whether Fischer was oriented as to time or place. Also, the officer stated that he received only
affirmative nods in answer to his questions with the exception of one shrug. Thus, he agreed
with defense counsel that he could not tell if Fischer's ability to answer questions was limited
to affirmative nods.
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Fry's ex-girlfriend, Karen LeDoux, also testified against Fry. She stated that Fry had told her
that he had beat up Fischer. She also testified that Fry had hurt her on previous occasions.
However, on cross-examination, LeDoux admitted that she had previously told the hospital
and an acquaintance that her injuries were caused by her boyfriend at the time, not Fry. In
addition, LeDoux testified that she had been convicted of forgery. Thus, although testimony
corroborated Burgess's testimony, it was questioned extensively on cross-examination.
Burgess's testimony was contradicted by Fry's version of events. Fry told investigating officers
that when Fischer came home on the morning of the injury, she appeared drunk or inebriated
in some manner. Fry told the officer that he heard her fall outside the house and that [**34]
when he helped her to the bedroom, she fell twice. Experts testified that Fischer's injuries
could have been caused by a fall or accident. Additionally, the statements incriminating Fry
were not corroborated by physical evidence. Consequently, had the trial court not erred in
admitting Burgess's testimony, the incriminating evidence against Fry would have been
substantially weaker.
Third, we review the extent of cross-examination. Defense counsel did not cross-examine
Burgess at the preliminary hearing. Although the prosecution knew that Burgess was in failing
health, it did not depose him before trial, a procedure which would have allowed defense
counsel an opportunity for cross-examination. See Crim. P. 15; Morse v. People, 180 Colo. 49,
53-54, 501 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1972). Additionally, although the trial court relaxed the rules for
admission of evidence which questioned Burgess's testimony, it did not allow the
impeachment evidence to be presented directly after Burgess's testimony was read to the
jury. Thus, the importance of the contradictory evidence may not have been fully realized.
Finally, the overall strength of the prosecution's case was questionable. [**35] Burgess's
testimony was read by a police officer and relied upon heavily by the prosecution. Although
the prosecution had corroborating witnesses, their testimony was not immune from attack.
Additionally, there was no physical evidence linking Fry to the crime. In sum, the prosecution
has not shown that the error in admitting Burgess's preliminary hearing testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

V. Conclusion

We find that the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when
the trial court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness at trial.
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, we hold that previous
testimony is not admissible at trial unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had an
adequate prior opportunity for cross-examination. Thus, we reiterate our holding in Smith
that a preliminary hearing does not present an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness at trial. Furthermore, we hold that the error was not harmless.
[*982] Accordingly, we affirm [**36] the decision of the court of appeals remanding the
case for a new trial.

Dissent by: JUSTICE COATS

v

dissenting

Dissent
JUSTICE COATS v dissenting.
In the United States Supreme Court's recent and dramatic re-interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct.
1354 (2004), the majority finds support for our own, quarter-century-old, blanket prohibition
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against using the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness whose death makes him
unavailable to testify at trial. Because I understand the analysis of Crawford to dictate
precisely the opposite result, I respectfully dissent.
In Crawford, the Supreme Court overturns a line of authority, stretching back at least as far
as 1980, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980), which
had evaluated the constitutional admissibility of prior testimony according to its
trustworthiness, whether or not the defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine. By
contrast, Crawford makes clear that where testimonial evidence is at issue, the Sixth
Amendment demands the satisfaction of two, and only two, conditions: "unavailability and a
prior opportunity (**37] for cross-examination." Id. at 1367-69. The Confrontation Clause
therefore can no longer be construed to permit the admission of prior testimony taken in the
absence of an opportunity for cross-examination, regardless of other guarantees of
trustworthiness; or, for that matter, to sometimes require the exclusion of prior testimony as
to which the defendant was given an opportunity to cross-examine, based on further scrutiny
of its trustworthiness.
11

11

Perhaps because Crawford was concerned only with an ex parte statement, made during
police interrogation, it made no attempt to further define the term "cross-examine" or specify
circumstances under which the opportunity to cross-examine might be considered
constitutionally inadequate. It also nowhere suggests, however, that the Confrontation Clause
envisions a more restrictive notion of cross-examination than the term itself implies or that
the right to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing must be considered inadequate. Quite the
contrary, using the term "ex parte" at least a dozen times, the Supreme Court leaves no
doubt that the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law
mode [**38] of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations, as
evidence against the accused. J_g~ at 1363.
11

11

11

11

11

11

The Crawford Court overruled Roberts, not only for analyzing the restrictions of the
Confrontation Clause too narrowly, which resulted in the admission of "statements that do
consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability; 11 but also for analyzing them
too broadly by applying the same reliability standard to hearsay not consisting of ex parte
testimony, which resulted in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from
the core concerns of the Clause." See id. at 1369. If the language it used were not clear
enough on its face, the Supreme Court's intent in referring to an opportunity to crossexamine" is apparent from its juxtaposition with the term "ex parte testimony" throughout, as
well as the Court's expressed concern to articulate a clear standard that avoids the ad hoc
analyses of the past. The Crawford analysis also makes abundantly clear that the Ohio
Supreme Court in State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d 191, 378 N.E.2d 492 (1978), erred in
excluding prior preliminary [**39] hearing testimony as a violation of the Confrontation
Clause, not for the reasons given by the Supreme Court at the time, but rather by discounting
statements in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970),
suggesting that the mere opportunity to cross-examine rendered the prior testimony
admissible." See Ohio v. Roberts, 100 5. Ct. at 2541.
11

11

11

By articulating a blanket prohibition against the use of preliminary hearing statements at trial,
the holding of this court in People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 597 P.2d 204 (1979), set this
jurisdiction apart from virtually every other jurisdiction in the country. [*9831 See, e.g.,
Rodriquez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 414 (Wyo. 1985) (expressly rejecting blanket prohibition of
Smith); see also King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1989)(same); see generally Francis M.
Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility or Use in Criminal Trial of Testimony Given at
Preliminary Proceeding by Witness not Available at Trial, 38 A.LR.4th 378, §§ 1-6 (2004) ("At
the present time, virtually all jurisdictions appear to allow the introduction of [**40]
testimony given at a preliminary proceeding, at which the accused was present and had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, when the witness is unavailable at trial.1'); 4
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 491(d), 782 (2nd ed. 1994
& Supp. 2003) (observing that by far the greater number of courts hold that receipt of
preliminary hearing testimony against the accused does not violate his constitutional rights).
This has been particularly true of the federal courts, which have found preliminary hearing
testimony constitutionally admissible at trial pursuant to Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which is virtually identical with CRE 804(b)(l). See, e.g., Ex rel Haywood v.
~Q!ff, 658 F.2d 455, 463 (7th Cir. 1981); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1980).
Crawford has only strengthened rather than undermined those holdings. See United States v.
Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The qualities that made [the witness'] testimony
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admissible under 804(b)(1): unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-examination
satisfy [**41] "Crawford's confrontation clause test.").

11

In Smith, this court distinguished Colorado on the basis of the limited nature of its preliminary
hearing. Limitations restricting the inquiry to probable cause and excluding questions of
witness credibility, however, do not make preliminary hearings in this jurisdiction significantly
different from those permitted by many other states or the federal government. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S. App. D.C. 302, 477 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (preliminary
hearing not a mini-trial on guilt but an investigation into reasonableness of bases for charge;
examination of witnesses not of same breadth as at trial); Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d
540, 549, 6 V.I. 395 (3d Cir. 1967) ("Credibility is not the issue at a preliminary hearing as it
is in a trial. All the arts of cross-examination which are exerted to impair the credibility of a
witness are useless in a preliminary hearing. Nevertheless, we must accept for present
purpose the rule which makes no distinction between testimony given at a prior trial and the
testimony given at a preliminary hearing. 11 ) .
Whether or not the defendant committed the crime of [**42] which he is charged is the
precise inquiry at a preliminary hearing, and the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, like
their federal counterparts, expressly guarantee a defendant the right to be represented by
counsel and to call and cross-examine witnesses. See Crim. P. S(a)(4)(11) & (7)(h)(2). A
preliminary hearing in Colorado is therefore not an ex parte proceeding and, as a matter of
law, guarantees the defendant an "opportunity to cross-examine." Although an assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is not within the scope of a probable cause determination, a
defendant is not barred from challenging the perceptions, memory, or even veracity of
witnesses who testify at a preliminary hearing. Nor is it irrelevant or meaningless to confront
a witness with the goal of inducing him to correct, modify, or even retract his earlier
statement. Even if the exercise of a court's discretion to limit examination could, under some
circumstances, render the opportunity for cross-examination constitutionally inadequate, the
blanket prohibition of Smith is unjustified.
In Smith, a case in which the primary holding concerning the materiality of perjured
statements was subsequently [**43] overruled by the Supreme Court, see United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 132 L. Ed. 2d 444, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995), this court relied upon the
state constitution to find a per se confrontation clause violation. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597
P.2d at 208. Nothing in the opinion indicates that the issue was presented as a challenge
under the state constitution, separate and apart from the corresponding provision of the
federal constitution, nor did this court attempt to articulate any distinction between the two.
In support of its ultimate holding, the court relied only upon State v. Roberts, which construed
the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution [*984] and was itself reversed shortly
thereafter by the Supreme Court. Because Smith neither suggests nor contains any
justification for a separate reading of the Colorado Constitution, and because any federal
underpinnings, upon which it may once have rested, have now clearly been removed by
Crawford, I would overrule it and reverse the court of appeals.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE KOURLIS v joins in the dissent. [**44]

Footnotes

1_1~_1
Specifically, we granted certiorari on the following questions:
Whether the pre-Rules of Evidence case of People v. Smith, 198 Colo.
120, 597 P.2cl 204 (1979), should be read to categorically prohibit the
admission of all preliminary hearing evidence even where: (a) the
evidence is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule set forth
in the Rules of Evidence; and (b) the evidence is supported by
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" sufficient to meet
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confrontation clause concerns as set forth by this court's and the United
States Supreme Court's case law guiding the admission of evidence
under exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Whether in light of the other evidence of the [respondent's] guilt, any
erroneous admission of the respondent's uncle's preliminary hearing
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

l. ~. !.l HN3'f
- The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... 11

11

HN4T-The Colorado Constitution states:

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses
against him face to face .... "

aJ;.

•

HN5'1!i Although the federal Confrontation Clause does not include specific language
requiring face to face confrontation, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "'simply
as a matter of English' it confers at least 'a right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial."' Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 101 L. Ed. 2d
857, 108 5. Ct. 2798 (1988) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175, 26 L. Ed.
2d 489, 90 5. Ct. 1930 (1970).
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Tab J

-·-·
INSTRUCTION NO.- - -

You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the

defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self..defense. If the defendant
has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt or if it raises a reason
to believe that the defendant acted in self-defense, then you must find him not guilty.
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is

any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.

State v. Harris, 58 Utah 331, 199 P. 145 (1921)
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980)
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)

Tab K

--..,

INSTRUCTION NO.

·z_.y

You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense. If the defendant

has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, then you must find
him not guilty.
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is

any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
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